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Gender in Asbestos Law:
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The large liteature about liabilhty for asbestos exposure has, for the most part, omitted
gender his omission matters. Men and women who sought nedess m court fared very
differently and the two gendems have shared unequalY in the spoils of asbestos litigation and
rgulation. Here I ask: Cui bono? Cui pacat? In other words-English words-this Article
investigates who has gained from and who has paid for the transfer of wealth put in motion by
asbestos law
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Put gender at one end of a spectrum and asbestos law at the other,
and one may wonder whether the twain can meet.
At the asbestos law side appear signature diseases, bankruptcy
trusts, environmental and workplace regulation, multidistrict litigation,
and billions of dollars. And men. Claimants, claimants' lawyers,
claimants' lawyers' adversaries, pleural registrants; insulators, miners,
plumbers, pipe fitters, stevedores, assemblers, railroad workers.' At
the other end of our spectrum-gender, or in this context, feminist
legal theory-we find relatively few men, little cash, and ample
abstract ideas. Formal equality, postmodemism, epistemology,
positionality, standpoint theory, sameness and difference, intersec-
tionality, and more.! The capacious category of gender within legal
theory embraces much, but what does asbestos have to do with it?
Focusing more on dollars than abstractions, this Article ventures an
answer.
The answer takes the form of questions. "Ci bono? Cid
pacal,'" a variation on "follow the money" rendered in Latin, follows
the suggestion of feminist legal theorist Katharine Bartlett by asking a
"woman question."' With respect to asbestos law in the United States,
I ask: Who benefits and who pays? Litigation about this substance
has caused billions of dollars to move.4 Here I consider the gender of
this movement, a large wealth transfer.
My contention is that the asbestos record reveals detriments for
women. Elsewhere I have used illustrations from asbestos precedents
to argue that empathy and sympathy-most of it from judges, but
some from adversaries' lawyers-helped enable a cohort of men to
achieve gains that had been regarded as unavailable to plaintiffs under
the rules and doctrine of civil procedure and torts.! This Article
1. See Malcolm Ross, A Survey ofAsbestos-Related Disease in Trades and Miing
Occupations and in Factory and Mig Communidies as a Means ofPredicting Health Risks
of Nonoccupadonal Exposues to Fibrous Minerals, in DEFINITIONS FOR ASBESTOS AND
OrHER HEALTH-RELATED SiucATEs 51, 58-60 (Benjamin Levadie ed., 1984).
2. For surveys, see MARTHA CHAMALLAs, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY (2d ed. 2003); and FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS (D. Kelly Weisberg ed.,
1993).
3. Katharine T. Bartlett, Femnist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 831
(1990). Bartlett joins the woman question with two other tasks-consciousness raising and
practical reasoning-that are also underway in this Article. Id
4. Anita Bernstein, Fellow-Feelig and Gender in the Law of Personal Injury, 18
J.L. & POL'Y 295, 303 (2009).
5. Id In a companion article, Anita Bernstein, Asbestos Achievements, 37 Sw. U. L.
REV. 691 (2008), I detail these extraordinary gains and give credit to plaintiffs' lawyers.
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connects my earlier attention to gender in personal injury law with the
Symposium's inquiry into legal developments relating to asbestos.
One answer to cui bono from asbestos law is men, I shall argue, while
women pacat in the form of exclusion from gender-based favors.
Along with men, women also pay an undiminished share of the social
costs that asbestos law has imposed on us all.
Let me state up front the clearest sense in which men have paid
for asbestos and women have gained. Because women in the United
States lacked, and still lack, access to the higher-wage unskilled and
semiskilled jobs where workers had to touch and breathe asbestos, far
more men than women are known to have been exposed to this toxin.'
Many men who recovered sizeable settlements or judgments and then
died of asbestosis, mesothelioma, or cancer must have suffered a great
deal before they could enjoy the settlements that their unimpaired
wives stood ready to inherit.' Payments also have gone to men who
were exposed at work but not impaired;' I am inclined to put these
individuals in the "pacat" category, because the harm of anticipating a
diagnosis of lung disease is genuine and not adequately repaired by
money, a wealth transfer in which wives share. The gendered
distribution of gain and pain examined in this Article acknowledges
the uncontroversial and severe detriment of workplace exposure that
has harmed male victims and, with the help of asbestos law, indirectly
enriched their female spouses. Further review of the record yields a
host of other gender disparities, however, all contrary to the material
interests of women.
As used in this Article, "asbestos law" means the responses that
legal institutions in the United States have made to the problem of
asbestos as a toxin that sickens and kills human beings. Regulation
preceded the rise of tort liability: the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) issued the first national-level legal response
in 1971 when it decreed maximum asbestos levels for workplace
6. The leading study of asbestos law notes that most claimants in the United States
alleged exposure at their workplaces, which featured "asbestos mining, manufacture, or
installation; shipyards; railroad and automobile maintenance; construction; chemicals; and
utilities." Stephen J. Carroll et al., Asbestos Litigation, INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, RAND 76-77
(2005), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RANDMG162.pdf
The RAND report and other sources say little about the gender of participants; this Article,
like writings about asbestos law generally, assumes that most plaintiffs who claim exposure to
asbestos are men.
7. I thank Aaron Twerski for his discussion of this point with me.
8. Michelle J. White, Asbestos and the Futur ofMass Torts 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 183,
193 (2004).
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exposure.! A Texas workers' compensation lawyer named Ward
Stephenson had set out ten years before then for recompense, filing the
first known tort claim for an asbestos injury." This plaintiff was
awarded only a disappointing $7,500, but Stephenson won a big
victory when he represented a coworker of this client, an asbestos-
exposed insulator named Clarence Borel who had toiled for decades in
shipyards and oil refineries." Borel v Fibreboard Paper Products
Corp. featured the first jury trial of a claim that a manufacturer had
failed to warn of the dangers of asbestos. 2
Understood to have launched large-scale tort liability for the
harms of exposure, Borel was one of several judicial decisions that
treated asbestos workers with unprecedented generosity. One famed
example of this bounty, Beshada v Johns-Manville Products Corp.,
held that an asbestos defendant could be liable for the failure to warn
about dangers "undiscoverable,"" in the Supreme Court of New
Jersey's phrase, at the time of marketing. All but retracted two years
after its issuance, 4 Beshada nevertheless remains the only decision by
a state high court that exposes a manufacturer to liability for not
warning about more of a product's dangers than it could have known.
Other plaintiff-favoring departures pervade asbestos case law.
Elsewhere I have gathered numerous other illustrations of these
"asbestos achievements," a rewriting of doctrine the likes of which
accident law has never seen.
Extraordinary favoritism in asbestos law spreads beyond judicial
decisions, and thus this Article looks at primary sources other than
cases. I apply Cui bono? Cuipacat?to statutes-including statutes of
limitation, a source of asbestos law made by legislatures and judges-
along with regulatory mandates and a legal form prominent in this
9. See id. at 185; Occupational Exposure to Asbestos, Tremolite, Anthophyllite and
Actinolite, 57 Fed. Reg. 24,310, 24,314 (June 8, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910,
1926).
10. Stephenson started this claim with a workers' compensation filing in 1961; a
complaint in court followed in 1966. Toxic TORT LmGATION 352-53 (D. Alan Rudlin ed.,
2007).
11. Beyond the Rhetoric: The Impact ofAsbestos Litation, SOUTHEAST TFx. REC.
(Nov. 17, 2008, 8:49 AM), http://setexasrecord.com/news/215936-beyond-the-rhetoric-the-
impact-of-asbestos-litigation.
12. White, supa note 8, at 186-87.
13. 447 A.2d 539, 547 (N.J. 1982).
14. Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 388 (N.J. 1984) (determining that
Beshada must be limited "to the circumstances giving rise to its holding").
15. See Bernstein, supra note 5.
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Symposium, asbestos trusts." My tally starts in Part II, "Inhaling
Asbestos at Home Rather than at Work."
A familiar locus of feminist legal theory," home has proved an
important venue in asbestos liability as well. Part II names female
plaintiffs who died, typically of mesothelioma, after years of shaking
out and washing asbestos-contaminated work clothes they had not
worn. Individual litigants in this category tend to lose in court. No
personal injury lawyer, as far as I can tell, has ever even tried to recruit
them into clusters to enhance their chances of redress: among groups
of asbestos plaintiffs, only male-dominated groups have reaped the
gains of aggregation." I compare these women to similarly situated
child plaintiffs, who also tend to lose but have fared distinctly better
than their mothers.
Making frequent references to the asbestos liability record, Part
Ed fills out this picture by examining how groups of women who
alleged approximately comparable sources of injury did worse in court
than their male asbestos peers. Thus Parts II and III of this Article
depict physically injured women as cui pacat, or among the losers of
asbestos law. Whether they brought asbestos-related disease claims of
their own or made claims about other harms, they paid in comparison
to men.
From this base, Parts IV and V of the Article move to consider a
set of gendered consequences that extend past injured plaintiffs. Part
IV "Pecuniary Gains Beyond Judgments and Settlements," follows the
cui bono money by observing how men became, and remain, more
enriched than women by the institutional machinery that occupies and
implements contemporary asbestos law. In Part V my survey of cii
pacat expounds on who is paying the asbestos law bill. Detriments to
groups-commercial creditors of insolvent businesses, insurers and
their customers, and taxpayers and the larger population base-fall on
every gender. Foreclosed from sharing equally in the gains of asbestos
law, women enjoy no shelter from its losses.
16. See infra Parts 1II.D, IV
17. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOwARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 35-36
(1989); JEANNIE SuK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: How THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS
TRANSFORMING PRIVACY (2009); Loma Fox, Re-Possessing "Home": A Re-Analysis of
Gender, Homeownership and Debtor Default for Feminist Legal Theory, 14 WM. & MARY J
WOMEN & L. 423 (2008); Laura A. Rosenbury, Work Wives, 36 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 345
(2013).
18. See infa Part III.E.3.
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II. INHALING ASBESTOS AT HOME RATHER THAN AT WORK
The paradigm here starts with a married woman who inhales
fibers that her husband, an asbestos worker, brought home from his
job. Typically she did not encounter asbestos from any other source.
She develops mesothelioma or asbestosis-both diseases bespeak
asbestos exposure' 9-and seeks redress in court. Not all courts have
said no to this plaintiff; some of the decisional law that comes out
against wives treats them fairly. But the pattern of hostility is striking,
especially in light of how comparatively well men injured by asbestos
have fared in court.
I discuss judicial rejection in the next two Subparts. The first
reviews how courts defeat wives' claims.20 Sometimes judges face
clear statutory authority that gives them little choice,2' but the common
law doctrines they also use-mostly variations on no duty-are
manipulable. For no good reason, or so I contend in the second
Subpart, asbestos children have done better in court than asbestos
wives."
A. The Wife-Launderer
Our paradigmatic wife-plaintiff lived with someone who
unwittingly brought home a substance that courts have identified as a
poison"-a source of danger attributed to unreasonable conduct if we
use negligence diction, a defective product in the vocabulary of
products liability. In a recurring scenario, the way this wife came to
inhale asbestos was via laundry. This individual and her lawyer would
plead negligence, whether labeled as such in a complaint or relocated
into the failure-to-warn subset of products liability.
19. Mesothelioma is close to a signature disease, that is, a condition that rarely
develops unless an individual was exposed to a particular antecedent. It is possible to develop
mesothelioma without exposure to asbestos, see Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Ligation
Cisis: Is There a Need for an Administrative AlteMative., 13 CARDOzo L. REv. 1819, 1842-
43 (1992), but the association is very strong. Carroll et al., supra note 6, at xxiv (stating that
"asbestos exposure is the only known cause" of mesothelioma). As for asbestosis, by its
definition, it cannot exist absent asbestos exposure. Am. Thoracic Soc'y, The Diagnosis of
Nonmalignant Diseases Related to Asbestos; 134 AM. REV. RESPIRATORY DISEASE 363, 367
(1986) (listing exposure as the first of six necessary criteria).
20. And the courts deny these claims with more vigor: although neither products
liability/negligence nor premises liability has been a winner for wives, these plaintiffs do
better with the former than the latter.
21. See irfm notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
22. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILYTY LAW 815 (2d ed. 2008) (observing that in
considering proximate cause, "courts are fickle when it comes to injured children").
23. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 E2d 1076, 1084 n.13 (5th Cir. 1973).
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These grounds for redress worked for Clarence Borel, the
patriarch of American asbestos plaintiffs. Seeking compensation,
Borel chose a diversity action in Texas federal court against the
manufacturers of asbestos materials that he had spent years installing.2 4
Negligence reasoning allowed courts to hold suppliers responsible for
asbestosis and mesothelioma-not just Clarence Borel's, of course, but
those of thousands of other workers whose claims followed.
In principle, negligence law gives a wife-launderer an advantage
that the husband-worker will usually lack: she may bring an action
against her husband's employer-not just the remote suppliers that fill
products liability case law involving male worker-plaintiffs-because
she is not barred by workers' compensation as an exclusive remedy for
unintentional injury suffered at a work site." Decisional law reports
numerous behaviors by employers that could fulfill the breach element
of a negligence claim, among them failure to warn workers; failure to
provide showers, uniforms, or masks to reduce the quantity of asbestos
dust that landed on and inside workers' bodies; and noncompliance
with OSHA regulations governing asbestos in the workplace.26 Courts
nevertheless have invoked duty to conclude that both suppliers and
employers had no obligation to avoid exposing employees' wives to the
risks of asbestos.
The duty rationale for ruling against wives has taken differing
forms. The high court of New York reminded one wife-launderer that
the state has never equated foreseeability with duty and insisted that
her husband's employer, the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey, had no relationship with her. Hence no duty, the New York
State Court of Appeals concluded.27 The Supreme Court of Georgia
focused on "policy" when it denied a duty to wife-launderers,
worrying about "an almost infinite universe of potential plaintiffs."2 3
Such framing appears to concede that harm to a wife-launderer is
foreseeable: yet in other states more open to foreseeability as a source
of duty, wife-launderers fare little better. The wife-launderer cohort
has one big victory, a decision by the foreseeability-focused Supreme
24. Id. at 1086.
25. Rebecca Leah Levine, Note, Clearmng the Ai- Ordhiary Negligence in Take-
HomeAsbestos ExposureLitgation, 86 WASH. L. REv 359, 368-69 (2011).
26. Id at 390-91.
27. InreN.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840N.E.2d 115, 120 (N.Y. 2005).
28. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208, 209 (Ga. 2005) (quoting Widera
v. ETTCO Wire & Cable Corp., 611 N.YS.2d 569, 570-72 (App. Div. 1994)).
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Court of New Jersey,29 and a handful of wins in intermediate appellate
courts." More typically, these plaintiffs lose, and again the rationales
vary. A Texas appellate court concluded that an employer in the 1950s
could not have been expected to understand that asbestos exposure
away from the workplace was dangerous and so another wife-
launderer had to lose on duty, even though she produced a 1948
internal memorandum by the corporate defendant informing workers
that "a health hazard existed if employees wore their clothes home
from work."" Moreover, the Walsh-Healey Act, codified by Congress
in 1936, required government-contract employers to provide asbestos
workers with a change of clothing."
Upholding summary judgment against a laundering family
member, the Iowa Supreme Court suggested that this plaintiff might
have fared better if her husband had been an employee of the
defendant. He was an independent contractor, however, and "[o]ne
who employs an independent contractor owes no general duty of
reasonable care to a member of the household of an employee of the
independent contractor."" In a decision that consolidated nine asbestos
actions against various defendants, one wife-launderer asked the trial
judge to instruct the jury that her husband's employer owed its
employees a safe workplace, an obligation that included a duty to warn
its employees of nonobvious dangers.34 The Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland approved the judge's denial of this proposed instruction,
29. Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143 (N.J. 2006). Olivo was remanded
for a determination of whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff's husband, noting
that a negative answer to that question would vitiate the wife's derivative claim. Id. at 1151.
30. The authoritative appellate-level wins against employers are Simpkhis V CSX
Corp., 929 N.E.2d 1257 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010), and Chaisson v Avondale Industries, Inc., 2005-
1511 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/20/06); 947 So. 2d 171. Zimko v Ameican Cyanamid 2003-0658
(La. App. 4 Cir. 6/8/05); 905 So. 2d 465, relied on an out-of-state decision that was later
reversed; the unpublished Honer v Ford Motor Co., No. B 189160, 2007 WL 2985271 (Cal.
Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2007), reversed summary judgment against a plaintiff without saying why.
Dixon v Ford Motor Co., 70 A.3d 328 (Md. 2013), upheld a judgment in favor of a wife-
launderer, but in Dixon, the defendant-employer seemed to concede its duty and breach,
focusing in its appeal on the admission of expert testimony and caps on noneconomic
damages. See id. at 330 n. 1 (noting that the court would not consider issues that Ford had not
raised on appeal).
31. Alcoa, Inc. v. Behringer, 235 S.W3d 456,460-61 (Tex. App. 2007). In fairness to
the defendant, the substance at issue in this memorandum was not asbestos. Nevertheless, as
the plaintiff put the point, "this memorandum evidences Alcoa's general knowledge that
'contaminants could be taken home."' Id at 462.
32. Levine, supm note 25, at 379; see also MICHAEL BOWKER, FATAL DECEPTION: THE
TERRIFYING TRUE STORY OF How ASBESTOS Is KILLING AMERICA 91-92 (2003) (reporting
corporate cover-ups of the known dangers during the 1940s).
33. Van Fossen v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 777 N.W2d 689,696 (Iowa 2009).
34. Adams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 705 A.2d 58,66 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998).
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holding that the employer "owed no duty to strangers based upon
providing a safe workplace for employees."" Wives, then, were
strangers. No duty to a wifelike launderer, agreed the Michigan
Supreme Court," using a certified question to dispatch a claim filed in
Texas and accepting the Texas court's articulation of the duty question
in terms of premises liability."
Courts disinclined to find a duty to wife-launderers have often
cast the cause of action as premises liability, even though these
claimants tend to plead their claims simply as negligence. Premises
liability and the rule of no affirmative duty to rescue are more or less
the only duty-based shelters for defendants against plaintiffs who link
their physical injury to the defendants' carelessness." Like the rescue
category, premises liability casts the defendant as passive-a person or
entity that did not do anything affirmatively wrong even if more
prudent conduct on its part would have lessened risks."
It is anomalous that courts attribute the passivity of premises
liability-that is, nonfeasance rather than misfeasance-to an asbestos
employer when a wife has complained about heedless neglect for her
well-being. For starters, premises liability traditionally has functioned
to limit claims of visitors who entered a possessor's land.40 Most wife-
launderers stayed away from their husbands' workplaces.4'
Related to this point, part of the rationale for limited duties to
land visitors is that a possessor should not be expected to modify the
place he occupies to comply with external judgments about safety for
third parties or the public.42 Premises liability, when it took form as a
35. Id.
36. In re Certified Question from the Fourteenth Dist. Court of Appeals of Tex., 740
N.W2d 206, 222 (Mich. 2007). On the "wifelike" category of plaintiffs, see mfra notes 69-
75 and accompanying text.
37. In re Certified Question from the Fourteenth Dist. Court ofAppeals of Tex., 740
N.W2d at 223 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (protesting that the Michigan Supreme Court had in
effect decided a case filed in another state without guidance from any appellate standard of
review).
38. One might mention the famous Palsgmf case, but the opinion for the court by
Judge Cardozo might be understood as finding no breach of duty as a matter of law, rather
than no duty. See JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT
LAW: RESPONSIBILrrIESANDREDRESS 320-21 (3d ed. 2012).
39. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 600 (2000) (explaining the focus on the
underlying principle of invitee status rather than the invitation).
40. See id. at 591 (describing the category as posing duties owed to persons on the
defendant's premises).
41. But see, e.g., Anderson v. A.J. Friedman Supply Co., 3 A.3d 545 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2010) (featuring a wife who had been an asbestos worker herself as well as a
launderer).
42. DOBBS, supm note 39, at 600.
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common law rule, declared that land conditions good enough for the
laird must be good enough for his visitors, who take his premises as
they find them.43 Trespassers and licensees of the old tripartite scheme
receive little more from courts beyond condemnation of a wanton
breach of their safety." This agrarian hierarchy of yore can fit modem
household spaces well enough, but limiting the duty of care to invitees
makes little sense for twentieth-century workplaces from which
workers carried particulate matter home on their clothing. Asbestos
enterprises did not live around the shop floors and shipyards and
engine rooms that endangered employees and their families. This
rationale for favoring a landed defendant cannot justify limiting the
claims of asbestos workers' wives.
Last, and most fundamentally, wife-launderers did not ascribe
their injuries to the omissions that characterize premises liability.
Instead these plaintiffs described purposeful, gain-seeking economic
activity that imposed risks on them.45 They complained foremost about
a failure to warn employees about dangers that these active business
behaviors imposed on families who reunited at the end of each day at
home. Wife-launderers accused defendants not of failing to act
affirmatively to protect them but of operating work sites in a
dangerous manner, with foreseeable consequences to those persons
who lived with their employees.
Rochon v Saberhagen Holdhgs, Inc.,4 an unreported decision of
the Washington Court of Appeals, grasps this basic distinction. The
court agreed with defendant-employer Kimberly-Clark that it owed a
wife-launderer no duty to protect her from dangers that arose away
from its operations and also owed her no duty of care under premises
liability. Kimberly-Clark did, however, have a duty "to prevent injury
from an unreasonable risk of harm it had itself created."' Stricken
with mesothelioma, Adeline Rochon was by no means home free at
that point. On remand, she would have to show "that, as a factual
matter, a family member who launders clothes could be a foreseeable
43. "The English common law from which our American law is derived was part and
parcel of a social system of which the landholders were the backbone. The judges were
drawn from the landowning classes or hoped to found a landowning family." Francis H.
Bohlen, Fily Years of Torts, 50 HARv. L. R.. 725, 735 (1937).
44. Id. at 736.
45. See, e.g., Riedel v. ICI Ams. Inc., 968 A.2d 17, 18-19 (Del. 2009) (rejecting the
claim of a wife who had said the defendant had released toxins "actively").
46. No. 58579-7-4, 2007 WL 2325214 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2007).
47. Id. at *3.
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victim of asbestos exposure.'"' In siding partially with both the
plaintiff and defendant, the Rochon court understood, and clearly
stated, that premises liability does not insulate wrongdoers from
responsibility just because their misconduct took place in a geographic
space that they possessed.49
Using premises liability to reject the claims of wife-launderers is
reliably correct under one condition: a state legislative mandate.
Ohio, for example, has chosen to immunize employer-possessors from
responsibility for take-home asbestos exposure of the kind that injures
wife-launderers: "A premises owner is not liable for any injury to any
individual resulting from asbestos exposure unless that individual's
alleged exposure occurred while the individual was at the premises
owner's property."so Kansas has made a similar decision covering
asbestos and silica: "No premises owner shall be liable" for exposure
to these substances, its legislature has decreed, unless the exposure
occurred on-site." Statutes like these exemplify what makes premises-
based rejection lawful.
The failure-to-warn subdivision of products liability remains an
alternative to the negligence contention that a court is likely to call
premises liability and dismiss, but case law is equally bleak for
wives"-courts have mostly eschewed this claim. One wife whose
children tried it, Dorothy Palmer, died of mesothelioma after years of
washing the clothes of her husband, an insulation worker." A jury
awarded her daughters $450,000. Reversing the judgment that
resulted, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held
that the defendant, Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corporation, had owed
Palmer no duty to warn. "Appellants could not have foreseen that Mrs.
Palmer would be exposed to their products in the manner in which she
was," wrote the court.54 Working men tend to be married; wives wash
their husbands' clothes; who knew?5
48. Id. at *4.
49. Cf Mae Kuykendall, Restatement of Place, 79 BROOK. L. REv. 757 (2014)
(noting the salience of place in the law).
50. Omo REv CODE § 2307.941(A)(1) (2014).
51. KAN. STAT. § 60-4905(a) (2013).
52. Like negligence, products liability has a single published victory for a wife-
launderer in a state supreme court. Stegemoller v. ACandS, Inc., 767 N.E.2d 974 (Ind. 2002).
53. Rohrbaugh v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 965 E2d 844, 845 (10th Cir.
1992).
54. Id. at 846.
55. At least by the time of the first Bush Administration, Congress and the President
knew. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs, Report to Congwss on WorkeYs' Home
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In a revealing footnote, the tort reform scholar Victor Schwartz
explored the depth of fear of laundry liability." Schwartz string-cited
five decisions to sound the slippery slope alarm. Allow recovery for
asbestos exposure at home, and where does it end?" Courts have
almost unanimously denied the claims of wife-launderers, yet
Schwartz listed "Premises Owner Liability for 'Take Home' Asbestos
Exposures" as second of five areas where prodefendant doctrinal
"[i]mprovements are needed."" Hard to imagine what these
improvements might be: almost no other claim in the annals of
asbestos liability has worked out more poorly for plaintiffs." Schwartz
expressed worry about the future. Going forward, he said, judges who
infer duty from foreseeability might be willing to side with wife-
launderers for claims based on "post-1972 nonoccupational
exposures," because the threat became more foreseeable to premises
owners after knowledge about danger progressed. He found only one
fix for the problem he identified: courts had better declare that "public
policy reasons ... limit the economic pursuit of potential defendants,
even in situations where the harm is arguably foreseeable."' Schwartz
did not supply these public-policy reasons. Instead he told judges,
who according to him have been wrongly enriching male claimants for
decades, not to enrich female ones who might in the future give the
foreseeability wheel a spin.62 Enough is enough.
B. Exposure of Children Contasted
If claims by wife-launderers against employers or manufacturers
are bad, then the claims of children also exposed to asbestos at home
via workers' clothes must be bad too. The conclusion follows a
fortiori. As plaintiffs, children are at least as unforeseeable as wives.
Contamination Study Conducted Under the Workes'FamilyPmtectionAct (29 USC 617a),
CTRs. FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Sept. 1995), http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/pdfs/95-123.pdf.
56. Victor E. Schwartz, A Letter to the Nationk Trial Judges.: Asbestos Litigation,
Major Progress Made over the Past Decade and Hurdles You Can Vault in the Nex4 36 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 1, 22 n.109 (2012).
57. Id
58. Id. at 15, 20.
59. The extraordinary notion that asbestos defendants have a duty to warn of a danger
not knowable to them has enjoyed about as much success: one isolated holding by the
Supreme Court of New Jersey. See supm notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
60. Schwartz, supa note 56, at 23-24.
61. Id. at 2 1.
62. Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, A Letter to the Nation Tnal Judges: How
the Focus on Efficiency Is Hurting You and Innocent Victims in Asbestos Liability Cases, 24
AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 247, 258-60 (2000).
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They suffered exposure equally far from a work site. To the extent
they differ from wife-launderers, they are worse plaintiffs, not better.
For example, because a worker can have more children than wives and
interact with them in ways that can be almost infinitely varied and
irregular, the likelihood of their being injured by employer carelessness
or a defective product is less. They are also harder than wives to warn.
Yet children have fared better than wives in the take-home subset
of liability for workplace exposure. They simply win more often,
without a judicial rationale for the disparity. In Lunsford v
Saberhagen Holdbgs, Inc., for example, one son won big: the
Washington Supreme Court concluded that even though exposure to
asbestos at the defendant's workplace had occurred in 1958, at least
eleven years before Washington adopted strict products liability, the
plaintiff could benefit from retroactive application of this doctrine."
One child-plaintiff decision by the Tennessee Supreme Court,"
praised by a commenter as "[p]erhaps the most comprehensive
analysis of the duty issue in a take-home asbestos case,"' stands as the
most generous piece of decisional law for plaintiffs who were exposed
to asbestos carried away from a workplace. Take-home claims allege
misfeasance, not nonfeasance, said the court, and so no special
relationship need exist between the defendant and plaintiff.66 Replete
with citations to learned works, Satterfield v Breeding Isuladon Co.
goes further than any other state high court in recognizing a duty owed
"to those who regularly and repeatedly come into close contact with an
employee's contaminated work clothes over an extended period of
time, regardless of whether they live in the employee's home or are a
family member."
The Satterfields of Satterfield presented poignant circumstances
to the Tennessee courts. Doug Satterfield was exposed to asbestos
when he worked for Alcoa in the 1970s. He and his wife had a child,
Amanda, who was born prematurely in 1979 and needed to stay in the
University of Tennessee hospital for her first three months. Doug
would go there to visit her as soon as his Alcoa shift ended, dressed in
his contaminated work clothes. Amanda was diagnosed with
mesothelioma in 2003. Exposed to poison in a neonatal unit, dying
63. 208 P.3d 1092, 1102-03 (Wash. 2009).
64. Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W3d 347 (Tenn. 2008).
65. Christopher W Jackson, Comment, Taking Duty Home: Why Asbestos
Litigation Reform Should Give Courts the Confidence To Recognize a Duty to Second-Hand
Exposure Victims, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1157, 1173 (2010).
66. Satterfeld 266 S.W3d at 355-56.
67. Id. at 374.
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from her exposure at twenty-five, Amanda, the nonlaunderer, could not
have appeared more innocent."
Laundry correlates with courtroom defeat: female relatives
younger than the worker who brought home asbestos, situated
similarly to Amanda Satterfield in this respect, fared differently when
they had washed his clothes. Judges apparently equate launderer-
plaintiffs with wives." Thus when Carolyn Miller filed suit attributing
her mesothelioma to work her stepfather had done relining the interiors
of iron-ore furnaces with asbestos at a Ford plant in Dearborn, the
Michigan Supreme Court answered "no duty" to the Texas court that
certified this question." To support its assertion that "the relationship
between Miller and defendant was highly tenuous," or not good
enough to win, the court noted that this plaintiff "sometimes washed"
the stepfather's clothes." The court did not question causation, just the
laundering relationship.
Another Texas stepdaughter-launderer, Kay Bilder, sought redress
for mesothelioma from a subcontractor that had employed her
stepfather. Bilder won a judgment, but a Texas court of appeals set it
aside." Another stepdaughter-launderer lost in the Iowa Supreme
Court." Yet another plaintiff developed mesothelioma after laundering
her father's and brother's clothes; like Kay Bilder, she prevailed in an
early round,74 and then a California appellate court used premises
liability to hold that the defendant owed her no duty." More recently,
in 2013, the highest court of Maryland concluded that an asbestos
68. Cf Anita Bernstein, Formed by Thalidomide: Mass Torts as a False Cure for
Toxic Exposure, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2153, 2164 (1997) ("Babies and children injured by
thalidomide set a standard of innocence to which few subsequent toxic-substance victims
could compare.").
69. In addition to Amanda Satterfield, daughters who stayed away from laundry and
prevailed in court include Joan Dube, who won a mesothelioma claim against the U.S.
government related to her father's exposure as a civilian employee of the Navy, see Dube v.
Pittsburgh Coming, 870 F2d 790 (1st Cir. 1989), and Jeanette Franklin, who won a
multimillion dollar jury verdict, see Henry K. Lee, $65 Million Awarded to Woman in
Secondhand Asbestos Case/Exposure Traced to Shipyard in '40s SFGATE (Mar. 23, 2000,
4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/6-5-Million-Awarded-to-Woman-in-Second
hand-276763 1.php.
70. In r Certified Question from the Fourteenth Dist. Court of Appeals of Tex., 740
N.W2d 206, 216 (Mich. 2007).
71. Id.
72. Fuller-Austin Insulation Co. v. Bilder, 960 S.W2d 914 (Tex. App. 1998),
judgment set aside Sept. 16, 1999.
73. See Van Fossen v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 777 N.W2d 689 (Iowa 2009).
74. Honer v. Ford Motor Co., No. B189160, 2007 WL 2985271 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct.
15, 2007).
75. Campbell v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390,404-05 (Ct. App. 2012).
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supplier owed no duty to warn a teen granddaughter-launderer," and a
federal trial court in Seattle, considering a claim brought by a woman
exposed to asbestos via laundry of both her father and her husband,
granted summary judgment to the defendant-employer, even though
the law of Washington, home of plaintiff-favoring case law for family
members, governed her action."
Being associated with a wife-launderer seems to harm the claims
of child plaintiffs in take-home exposure cases, at least in Georgia.
One loss for children, CSX Tmansportadon, Inc. v Williams, combined
the claim of a wife-launderer with those of three nonlaunderer
children; the Supreme Court of Georgia found no duty." An
unreported case duly cited this one in ruling against a plaintiff son."
Another Georgia decision, Hoffman v AC&S, Inc., stayed clear of
laundry." The plaintiff lost, but only because of her problem with
identification: her brother, the laborer, could not recall having seen
any manufacturers' names at his job site." Litigating as a nonlaunderer
put Elaine Hoffman in just as good a position as a worker himself.
III. How ASBESTOS-HARMED MEN HAVE FARED BETTER IN
COURT THAN COMPARABLY HARMED WOMEN
A. Reprieves in the Prhna Fade Case
In contrast to the severity that wife-launderers have experienced
in court on the question of duty, male plaintiffs in asbestos law have
received lenient treatment on two other fundamentals present in any
tort claim: injury and causation. Normally a plaintiff who lacks
evidence of either of these two elements can expect dismissal or a loss
on summary judgment. The reprieves from the rigors of the prima
facie case enjoyed by male asbestos plaintiffs remain undertheorized
and unexplained. In Fellow-Feeling and Gender in Personal Injury
Law, I attributed them to empathy and sympathy by men for men."
This attribution could be wrong, but the extraordinary success of
American male asbestos plaintiffs has never been questioned.
76. Georgia Pacific, LLC v. Farrar, 69 A.3d 1028, 1030-31 (Md. 2013).
77. Hoyt v. Lockheed Shipbuilding Co., No. C12-1648 TSZ, 2013 WL 3270371, at
*8 (WD. Wash. June 26, 2013). On Washington's proplaintiff stance, see supm notes 46-49,
63 and accompanying text.
78. 608 S.E.2d 208, 208 (Ga. 2005).
79. Wood v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. CV 294-008, 2005 WL 2100991 (S.D. Ga. Aug.
26, 2005).
80. 548 S.E.2d 379 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
81. See id. at 381-84. On identification, see infra note 91 and accompanying text.
82. Bernstein, supra note 4, at 377-78.
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Regarding injury: rather than get booted for not having any,
unimpaired workplace-exposed plaintiffs had their names put on the
"inactive docket'" an innovation designed to save them from losing on
statute of limitation grounds should injuries manifest later." Some
men have collected twice, once for exposure and the second time for a
disabling injury that manifested later.' Courts have also stretched the
definition of injury. They rewarded male plaintiffs who reported only
exposure followed by pathology that appeared only on examination of
the lungs and that produced no impairment: damages for noninjurious
pleural plaque have reached $5 million, and settlements have run
high." Judges have also deemed what happened to unimpaired men an
actionable emotional injury, even though plaintiffs who claim
accidental harm to their feelings usually encounter judicial
skepticism." Unimpaired women, by contrast, simply do not collect
for the wrong of exposure."
Like the injury element, causation also contains multiple
instances of judicial generosity. The products liability scholar Jane
Stapleton has documented the judicial leap needed to resolve
mesothelioma claims in favor of exposed plaintiffs. Litigants, lacking
scientific knowledge of how asbestos exposure causes mesothelioma,
could not show which of several sources of exposure caused this
disease." Yet plaintiffs prevailed. Standard causation doctrine ought to
favor an asbestos supplier when the injury is lung cancer and the
plaintiff smoked; plaintiffs nevertheless regularly prevail." Asbestosis
is less vulnerable than mesothelioma and lung cancer to this criticism
about shaky evidence, but the identification subset of causation-that
83. See id at 338 nn.160-61 (quoting the Oxford English Dictionary position that to
be "on a docket," a case must be active, in hand, or under consideration).
84. White, supia note 8, at 193.
85. Id
86. See hfia Part III.B (noting that after recognizing emotional harm as an injury,
courts favored plaintiffs with other reprieves).
87. See infia notes 107-108 and accompanying text (noting the failure of women to
prevail using emotional distress, the only route to court for an unimpaired plaintiff not
aggregated among fellow workers); see also Lester Brickman, Lawyers'Ethics andFiduciaty
Obigation m the Brave New World ofAggregative Litigation, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
PoL'Y REv 243, 273 (2001) (stating that if the courts had insisted on impairment as a criterion
for recovery, there would have been no asbestos litigation crisis).
88. Jane Stapleton, Two Causal Fictions at the Heart of US. Asbestos Doctrne, 122
LAW Q. REv. 189, 189-90 (2006). Several years after the publication of this article, the
highest court of Maryland condoned the admission of testimony by an expert for a wife-
launderer plaintiff, stating that "every exposure to asbestos is a substantial contributing
cause" of mesothelioma. Dixon v. Ford Motor Co., 70 A.3d 328, 335 (Md. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
89. Bernstein, supra note 5, at 710-11.
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is, an answer to the question of which asbestos business supplied the
injurious product-has been another locus of generosity. Courts have
allowed workers to testify that in past years they saw, and right now
they recall, brand names on asbestos products even when such
testimony includes hearsay or is unreliable under the circumstances.'
Well-drilled asbestos plaintiffs have delivered such confident
recollections of defendants' brand names decades after they last saw
them that the tort reformer Walter Olson was moved to sarcasm in an
article title. "Thanks for the Memories," he wrote.'
B. Emotional Distress Honored
Claims for emotional distress have never been a judicial
favorite;9 toxic exposure is a particularly disfavored source of this
harm." The United States Supreme Court, which has had relatively
little to say about products liability,94 has opined a couple of times on
the subject in asbestos decisions. It concluded that exposure without
symptoms of disease did not suffice to support a claim for emotional
distress under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)." One
Florida court went further, rejecting a claim from a man who suffered
90. SeeBrickman, supra note 19, at 1844.
91. Walter Olson, Thanks for the Memories, REASONCOM (June 1, 1998), http://
reason.com/archives/1998/06/01/thanks-for-the-memories. For a tart rejoinder, see W
William Hodes, The Professional Duty To Holseshed Witnesses-Zealously Within the
Bounds ofthe Law, 30 TEx. TECH L. REv 1343, 1354 (1999).
92. To some writers, this stance raises concerns about gender. See Martha
Chamallas, Removing Emotional Haim from the Core of Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 751,
752 (2001); Jean Thomas, Which Interests Should Tort Protect., 61 BuFF. L. REV. 1, 19-21
(2013). I do not in this Article argue for more judicial acceptance of emotional distress
actions and focus only on parity between men's and women's claims.
93. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad
Exposur-Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53
S.C. L. REv. 815, 827 (2002) (noting that the cause of action "allows recovery for serious and
immediate emotional distress arising from conduct that was either violent or traumatic in
nature").
94. See Anita Bernstein, Products Liability in the United States Supreme Court: A
Venture in Memory ofGary Schwartz, 53 S.C. L. REv 1193 app. at 1222-23 (2002) (offering
a list of only twenty-five decisions through 2001).
95. See, e g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Hensley, 556 U.S. 838, 839-40 (2009) (per curiam)
(offering guidance for jury instructions when a plaintiff with asbestosis seeks damages for
fear of cancer); Norfolk & W Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 157 (2003) (requiring a plaintiff
to show, inter alia, a diagnosis of asbestosis to recover for fear of cancer); Metro-N.
Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 427 (1997) (rejecting the claim because the
plaintiffs had not been diagnosed with an illness).
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from asbestosis and then complained of emotional distress in the form
of fear of cancer."
More often, however, asbestos-exposed men have fared well
when they sought recovery for emotional distress linked to fear of
cancer, especially when they had been diagnosed with a lung disease.
Judicial liberality has taken several manifestations. First, courts permit
recovery even when the plaintiff cannot show that he is likely to get
cancer: what he fears need not be more probable than not." Second,
courts take a diagnosis of asbestosis as supportive of the plaintiff's fear
of cancer, even though asbestosis does not cause cancer and is likely
just another consequence of the same asbestos exposure that
sometimes does, and sometimes does not, cause cancer and other
diseases." Pleural thickening alone, one of the benign disorders linked
to asbestos exposure, has also sufficed to support fear-of-cancer
emotional distress claims," even though, as with asbestosis, "there is
no evidence that pleural plaque confers an increased risk of lung
cancer or pleural mesothelioma within a population of individuals
having the same cumulative asbestos exposure."'a
The most striking liberality has been judicial relief from the
venerable demand that plaintiffs seeking redress for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress prove some kind of manifestation of
this distress in their bodies. Physical manifestation has traditionally
meant trauma or pathology. Although courts regularly reject emotional
96. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 527-29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985). Courts occasionally say there is an association between asbestosis and an increased
risk of lung cancer and mesothelioma, but back up this assertion with little if any evidence.
See, e g., Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 464 A.2d 1020, 1022 (Md. 1983) (quoting
from a conclusory affidavit and citing medical literature that did not report an increased risk).
97. In Watans v Fibreboard Corp., 994 E2d 253 (5th Cir. 1993), for example, the
court allowed the plaintiff to recover for fear of cancer (he had asbestosis) that was
"proximately caused by his asbestos exposure, even if such distress arises born fear of
diseases that am a substantial concern but not medically probable." Id at 259; see also
Henderson & Twerski, supa note 93, at 823-24 (reviewing other decisions).
98. See Lavelle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 507 N.E.2d 476, 480-87 (Ct.
Com. Pl. Cuyahoga Cnty., Ohio, 1987) (holding that asbestosis was good enough to support
fear of cancer); blfra note 100 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 E2d 79, 85 (3d Cir. 1986)
(allowing a plaintiff who had only pleural thickening to recover for fear of cancer); Hoerner v.
ANCO Insulations, Inc., 2000-2333, pp. 42-43 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/23/02); 812 So. 2d 45, 74
(same); Mauro v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 542 A.2d 16, 24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1988) (same), aff sub nom. Mauro v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 561 A.2d 257 (N.J. 1989).
100. J. Ameille et al., Asbestos-Related Cancer Risk in Patients with Asbestosis or
PleurlPlaques, 28 REVUE DES MALADIES RESPIRATOIRES el i, el i (2011) (Fr.).
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distress claims on this ground,"' they have approved fear-of-cancer
emotional distress claims when plaintiffs suffer no disease at all. 2
Some of these instances of generosity from judges spare plaintiffs
even the task of assembling evidence about their distress. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found it sufficient that one
plaintiff had heard from his doctor that asbestos inhalation increased
his risk of serious illness: "People today are sensitive to the dangers of
cancer," wrote the court."' "Mental anguish would reasonably follow
after [the plaintiff] was informed by a reliable source-his physician-
that his exposure to defendants' products had heightened his risk of
developing these deadly diseases."'" Citing very little authority, one
New Jersey trial court coined an indulgent, easy-to-meet four-part test
for fear-of-cancer claims.o' In another illustration of judicial
generosity, a group of firefighters succeeded in a fear-of-cancer
emotional distress claim against Louisiana State University following
an ill-conceived training program in a building that contained asbestos.
Some of these distressed persons had been exposed only on part of one
day as they fought a fire.'
Women, by contrast, reliably lose when they try to file a
freestanding emotional distress claim based on exposure to asbestos
with no physical illness. Mere inhalation with or without pleural
thickening has not supported recovery for any female emotional-
distress claimant, as it has for men, in any reported decision. Courts
report a host of emotional-distress rejections when the distressed
asbestos-exposed litigant was female. Most of these plaintiffs lost on
101. Courts ruled against male plaintiffs in several emotional-distress decisions on the
ground that these plaintiffs lacked physical symptoms of disease. See, eg., Metro-N.
Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 428-29 (1997); Contreras v. Thor Norfolk
Hotel, L.L.C., 292 E Supp. 2d 798, 804 (E.D. Va. 2003); Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d
232, 238 (Pa. 1996); Temple-Inland Forest Prods. Corp. v. Carter, 993 S.W2d 88, 93 (Tex.
1999).
102. See, eg., Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 E2d 456,468 (5th Cir. 1985); Devlin v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495, 500 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).
103. Dartez, 765 .2d at 468.
10 4. Id.
105. A plaintiff would have to prove that he is suffering from "serious fear or
emotional distress or a clinically diagnosed phobia of cancer," that this fear was caused by
exposure to asbestos, that his "fear of getting cancer . .. is reasonable,' and that the defendant
is "legally responsible" for the plaintiff's exposure. Devln, 495 A.2d at 499. Absent from
this recitation is any mention of duty, a judicial demand regarding physical manifestations, or
how to add content to the "reasonable" criterion in the third element. Id.
106. The university argued to no avail that the plaintiffs did not even establish that the
asbestos in the building was friable, or unstable, enough to be dangerous. Lilley v. Bd. of
Supervisors of La. State Univ., 98-1277, pp. 9-10 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/24/99); 735 So. 2d 696,
701.
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the ground of not having alleged any physical manifestation,' 7 but
other routes to their defeat turn up in decisional law.0'
Judicial skepticism toward women who alleged emotional
distress from toxic exposure dates back to the 1980s. Courts agreed
with plaintiffs that DES, a synthetic hormone, caused a variety of
reproductive-organ diseases in persons exposed to the substance in
utero, ranging from cancer to more benign anomalies like adenosis.'"
They have been reluctant, however, to compensate these women for
emotional distress.
In an influential decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court demanded that a plaintiff show not only physical harm from her
DES exposure but also "objective symptomatology ... substantiated
by expert medical testimony.""o The court worried about the unreliable
female narrator: "A plaintiff may be genuinely, though wrongly,
convinced that a defendant's negligence has caused her to suffer
emotional distress. If such a plaintiff's testimony is believed, and there
is no requirement of objective corroboration of the emotional distress
alleged, a defendant would be held liable unjustifiably.""' One court
was willing to accept a DES claim for emotional distress because the
plaintiff's physical manifestation of her distress was "a pre-cancerous
condition.""' Asbestosis cannot, and apparently need not, get over a
hurdle that demands premalignancy."'
107. See Deleski v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 819 E2d 377, 380 (3d Cir. 1987);
Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480 A.2d 647 (Del. 1984). In Hughes v Johns-
Manville Corp., 7 Phila. Cnty. Rptr. 620, 638 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1982), the court acknow-
ledged that inhalation might satisfy an impact criterion, but granted summary judgment to the
defendant because the plaintiff could not show "that physical impact or injury accompanies
her claimed emotional [distress]."
108. See, eg, Cathcart v. Keene Indus. Insulation, 471 A.2d 493, 507 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1984) (holding that a wife could not recover for fear for herself nor for distress from watching
her husband suffer from asbestosis, because she had no physical injury); Walston v. Boeing
Co., 294 P3d 759, 763 n.7 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that plaintiff's wife's laundry-based
fear-of-cancer claim was dismissed by stipulation).
109. Anita Bernstein, Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Co.: Markets ofMothers, Mn TORTS
SToRIEs 151, 152 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003).
110. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 172 (Mass. 1982).
111. Id. at 175; see also Plummer v. Abbott Labs., 568 E Supp. 920, 927 (D.R.I. 1983)
(holding that ingestion of DES was neither an impact nor physical manifestation and hence
the plaintiff could not recover for her emotional distress).
112. Wetherill v. Univ. of Chi., 565 E Supp. 1553, 1559 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
113. See Bernstein, supra note 4, at 354. Shepardizing Payton yields a host of
decisions that cite this precedent but relieve men from the rigors of its standard when they
claim emotional distress occasioned by toxic exposure.
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C More Medical Monitorhng
Entities responsible for toxic exposure that has not yet caused
physical injury could in principle be ordered to pay for medical
surveillance, or monitoring, of the persons they wrongly exposed. The
idea behind medical monitoring as a court-ordered remedy is to catch
the onset of disease at a point when treatment interventions are at their
most promising, rather than force exposed persons to wait for a
diagnosis before they can recover.11 Yet while "early detection saves
lives" continues to be popular as a slogan,"' neither defendants,
plaintiffs, nor judges have ever shown enthusiasm for medical
monitoring as a response to toxic exposure. For defendants, the
expense of this monitoring is costly and ongoing-hard to quantify or
plan for. Plaintiffs might want it, but they have to speak through
lawyers retained on contingency; unless the cost of medical monitoring
is awarded in a lump sum, it will seldom provide a lucrative
denominator to facilitate the payment of attorneys' fees."'
Judicial aversion to medical monitoring lacks a pecuniary
explanation of this kind, but case law makes it plain. Whereas judge-
authored multifactor criteria for most causes of action contain fewer
than six elements, the factors that plaintiffs must establish for medical
monitoring can number seven or eight and are phrased conjunctively
rather than as alternatives or in a balancing test."' Litigants find it
almost impossible to win class certification for this claim."'
This judicial aversion is equally plain in its results for individuals.
Like most claimants of any gender who seek medical monitoring,
asbestos-exposed plaintiffs tend to lose. And so medical monitoring
114. So stated the first decision to approve medical monitoring. Friends for All
Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 825-26 (D.C. Cir. 1984). But see
inhfa notes 142, 164 and accompanying text (discussing other possible uses of this remedy).
115. A business called Longevity owns the "earlydetectionsaveslives" domain name.
LONGEVITY-EARLY DETECTION SAVES LIVES, http://earlydetectionsaveslives.com (last
visited May 5, 2014); see Breast Cancer Early Detection, AM. CANCER SoC'Y, http://www.
cancer.org/acs/groups/cid/documents/webcontent/003165-pdf.pdf (last revised Jan. 28, 2014).
116. That said, class certification can enrich plaintiffs' lawyers. See LESTER
BRICKMAN, LAWYER BARONS: WHAT THEIR CONTINGENCY FEES REALLY COST AMERICA 193
(2011) ("In jurisdictions that allow medical-monitoring class actions, lawyers can, in theory,
aggregate hundreds of thousands and even millions of consumers into class actions based
solely on exposure to alleged toxic substances and seek a lump sum of billions of dollars for
medical testing.").
117. See Joseph K. Hetrick & Allison M. Brown, Cause of Action for Medical
Monitonag Relating to the Use ofMedicalDevices and Pascnption Drugs, in 34 CAUSES OF
ACTION 2d 249, § 9 (2007) (gathering eight states' versions of a multifactor test).
118. Debra M. Perry & Zane C. Riester, Turning the Tide: The Viability ofMedical
Monitonag ClassActions, FOR THE DEF., July 2009, at 26, 27.
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differs from the male-winner doctrines discussed earlier in this Part."'
Accordingly, my claim about gender unfairness takes a different form.
I work from a central tenet of fairness: treat like cases alike. 120
Consider the shortest set of criteria for medical monitoring, a
sensible four-factor test used in the District of Columbia:
(1) [P]laintiff was significantly exposed to a proven hazardous
substance through the negligent acts of the defendant; (2) as a
proximate result of that exposure, plaintiff suffers a significantly
increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease; (3) that increased
risk makes periodic medical examinations reasonably necessary; and
(4) monitoring and testing procedures exist which make the early
detection and treatment of the disease possible and beneficial.121
The third and fourth elements of this test are ones most central to
medical monitoring. The first and second address injury and
proximate cause, present in all claims for accidental harm, rather than
what is unique about medical monitoring: a premise that forward-
looking surveillance helps to repair the damage of exposure.
In relation to these last elements-that ongoing medical attention
must be reasonably necessary in response to the risk and that it must be
useful enough to benefit the person who is monitored-consider three
substances that have given rise to medical monitoring claims in recent
decades: asbestos, as encountered in workplaces; fen-phen, the diet
drug; and Prempro, a drug that combines estrogen and progestin to
treat symptoms of menopause. The theme of gender division
continues. Most persons claiming asbestos exposure at work were
male; all persons who sought to blame Prempro for injury to their own
bodies were female; fen-phen plaintiffs have been overwhelmingly
female.12
Of the three substances, fen-phen has gained medical monitoring
for plaintiffs most consistently. A consolidated federal action, centered
in Philadelphia, certified a class of six million members and approved
a settlement that included this remedy.'23 Before this national-level
119. See supm Part III.A-B.
120. See JUDiTH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLMCAL TRIALS 119
(1964) (linking this principle with the rule of law).
121. Arias v. DynCorp, 928 F. Supp. 2d 10, 16 n.2 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Reed v.
Philip Morris Inc., No. 96-5070, 1997 WL 538921, at *16 n.10 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 18,
1997)).
122. Bernstein, supm note 4, at 361-62 (reporting the gender pattern of asbestos and
fen-phen claims).
123. In re Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d 220, 225-29 (3d Cir. 2002) (summarizing the
litigation); In re Diet Drugs, Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL 1222042, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
28, 2000) (describing the settlement).
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class certification in 1999, medical monitoring classes were certified
by state courts in Illinois, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Texas,
Washington, and West Virginia;124 after the federal certification, Florida
followed.125  Not all plaintiffs' efforts succeeded,'2 ' but fen-phen
litigation remains on the whole a rare exception in the annals of
medical monitoring.127
Working from the apparent premise among judges that medical
monitoring ought to be awarded sparingly, here I contend that fen-phen
earned its success for plaintiffs, while exposure to neither asbestos nor
Prempro warranted it. If courts had treated the two genders alike-
giving both equal presumptive access to this remedy ex ante-then
fen-phen exposure would have stood out to them as extraordinarily
worthy of paid-for surveillance. Asbestos would have appeared
considerably less deserving than Prempro: although the commonality
criterion of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure likely
means that neither of the two claims is suited to aggregation in a class
action,128 at least Prempro's risks are within the therapeutic reach of
early diagnosis. Yet Prempro-exposure claims for medical monitoring
encountered almost total failure in court.129 Like cases have not been
treated alike.
On the winner of medical monitoring, fen-phen, a diet drug that
was taken mostly by women before it left the market, caused two
cardiovascular effects: heart valve defects, also known as valvular
disease, and primary pulmonary hypertension (PPH), a pathology of
124. In re Diet Drugs, No. CIV A. 98-20626, 1999 WL 673066, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
26, 1999).
125. Petito v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 So. 2d 103, 104-06 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
126. See, eg., Baker v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. Div., 992 S.W2d 797, 799 (Ark. 1999)
(refusing to certify a fen-phen class that sought medical monitoring, inter alia); Wood v.
Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., Div. of Am. Home Prods., 82 S.W3d 849, 852 (Ky. 2002) (affirming the
dismissal of a complaint).
127. See Perry & Riester, supranote 118, at 29.
128. But see A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality and
DechingAccess to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REv. 441, 449 (2013) (arguing that the commonality
criterion, properly understood, permits more aggregation than Supreme Court decisional law
has tolerated).
129. The attempt to certify a national-level class for medical monitoring failed in
2005. See In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 230 F.R.D. 555 (E.D. Ark. 2005). State-level
failures to obtain class certification for medical monitoring following Prempro exposure
include Wyeth, Inc. v Gottlieb, 930 So. 2d 635 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006), Vitanza v Wyeth,
Inc., 2006 WL 462470 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Jan. 24, 2006), and Albertson v Wyeth, No.
2944, 2005 WL 3782970 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila Cnty. May 3, 2005). An earlier decision in
Albertson had permitted a claim for medical monitoring, but the subsequent rejection of class
certification limited this success for plaintiffs. SeeAlbertson v. Wyeth Inc., No. 2944, 2003
WL 21544488 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila Cnty. July 8,2003).
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the heart and lungs.3o Mayo Clinic scientists who broke the news
focused on valvular disease, the much more common condition of the
two.31
Fen-phen exposure calls for echocardiogram surveillance, a
technology that fits the central elements of a medical-monitoring claim
noted above. The increased risk of cardiac disease associated with fen-
phen exposure is well supported.3 2 Both valvular disease and PPH
respond to treatment; cures tend to elude both conditions, but early
intervention is better.' As for the intervention itself, the United States
Department of Health and Human Services has recommended
echocardiogram surveillance for persons exposed to fen-phen (or
fenfluramine alone) even if a clinical examination finds no symptoms
of heart or lung disease.'34 The American Heart Association and
American College of Cardiology have issued policy guidelines
concerning valvular disease that comport with this recommendation.'
Some jurisdictions impose on claims for medical monitoring another
requirement that fen-phen meets easily: the intervention must be
something not normally recommended absent exposure.6 Fen-phen is
130. Heidi M. Connolly et al., Valvular Heart Disease Associated with Fenfluramine-
Phenternnine, 337 NEw ENG. J. MED. 581, 581 (1997); see Bryan L. Roth, Drugs and Valvular
Heart Disease, 356 NEw ENG. J. MED. 6, 6 (2007); Tatsuo Tomito & Qiong Zhao, Autopsy
Findhngs of Heart and Lungs in a Patient with P imary Pulmonary Hypertension Associated
with Use of Fenfluiammne and Phentermie, 121 CHEST 649, 649 (2002). Although the
National Institutes of Health reports that "idiopathic pulmonary arterial hypertension" has
replaced primary pulmonary hypertension, I stay with PPH in this Article because this term
was used in the fen-phen case law I discuss. Pulmonary Hypertension, MEDLINEPLUS,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/0001 12.htm (last updated Feb. 26, 2014).
131. See Camille N. Tragos, Fen-Phen Ligation Against American Home Products
Corpordtion: The Widespread Use of Fenfluramie (Pondunia) and Dexfenfluramie
(Redux) for Weight Loss, The Health Problems Associated with Those Drugs, the Resulting
Litigation Against American Home Pro4 DIGITAL ACCESS TO SCHOLARSHIP AT HARv. 21-22
(2000), http://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/8965626/.
132. See, e.g., Connolly et al., supm note 130.
133. William Hopkins & Lewis J. Rubin, Treatment of Pulmonary Hypertension in
Adults, UPTODATE, http://www.uptodate.com/contents/treatment-of-pulmonary-hyperten
sion-in-adults (last updated Feb. 23, 2014) (discussing therapies for pulmonary hypertension);
What Is Heart Valve Disease., NAT'L HEART, LUNG, & BLOOD INST., NIH (Nov. 16, 2011),
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/health-topics/topics/hvd/ ("Currently, no medicines can cure
heart valve disease. However, lifestyle changes and medicines often can successfully treat
symptoms and delay problems for many years. Eventually, though, you may need surgery.").
134. Tragos, supanote 131, at 31-32.
135. Idat3l.
136. These jurisdictions include Utah, see Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858
P2d 970, 982 (Utah 1993); Pennsylvania, see Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep't of the Army
& Dep't of Def. of the U.S., 696 A.2d 137, 145-46 (Pa. 1997); and Florida, see Petito v. A.H.
Robins Co., 750 So. 2d 103, 106-07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). Routine medical care,
especially for the demographic harmed by fen-phen, generally does not include screening by
1234
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not a perfect candidate for medical monitoring,'" but it fulfills the
judicial criteria for it better than almost any other toxin.
Fen-phen compares especially well to asbestos.'3 ' When the
Supreme Court rejected medical monitoring for an asbestos-exposed
person who had sought relief under FELA, the Court was careful to
call the plaintiff "sympathetic" and to express, in dicta, endorsement
for medical monitoring in some form other than the "lump-sum
damages recovery" that he had demanded.'" Other asbestos-exposed
plaintiffs who sought medical monitoring, free from the chafing text of
FELA, have prevailed under state common law.'40
No matter that, if I may quote myself, "[o]nce exposed to
asbestos, a person cannot unbreathe the fibers that entered his lungs,
nor undo through monitoring whatever damage lies in store for him."4 '
Many courts have taken the same view and rejected medical-
monitoring claims following asbestos exposure.42 The chief justice of
the Louisiana Supreme Court, however, deemed medical monitoring
perfectly consistent with the inability of contemporary medicine to do
anything curative for a person exposed to asbestos. It would make him
feel better:
If a plaintiff has been placed at an increased risk for a latent disease
through exposure to a hazardous substance, absent medical monitoring,
an echocardiogram. Bernstein, supm note 4, at 363. Medical monitoring therefore renders to
fen-phen plaintiffs something that they do not already receive and that fits closely with the
exposure they suffered.
137. Lester Brickman has reported some infirmities of fen-phen medical monitoring.
See BRiCKMAN, supra note 116, at 193 (observing that mere "cessation" of taking fen-phen,
without more, has a good effect on patients' health); Lester Brickman, The Use ofLigation
Screenings in Mass Torts: A Formula for Fraud., 61 SMU L. REv. 1221, 1243-61 (2008)
(locating instances of misreading and exaggerated diagnoses following fen-phen screenings
by echocardiogram). Fair enough, but it is at least possible to find some treatable disease that
would otherwise elude detection.
138. Few scholars put the two products together. For a noteworthy exception, see S.
Todd Brown, How Long Is Forever This Time? The Broken Promise of Bankruptcy Trusts,
61 BuFF. L. REv. 537, 571-72 (2013), observing that whereas the fen-phen global settlement
provided for mandatory audits of 15% of claims and imposed severe penalties for fraud,
asbestos trusts are rarely obliged to audit claims and take little advantage of the auditing
opportunities given them in trust instruments.
139. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424,443-44 (1997).
140. See Bernstein, supra note 4, at 360-61 (citing four decisions from both state and
federal courts); id. at 367 (contrasting two New Jersey claims for medical monitoring, alike in
all pertinent respects except that the winning plaintiff was male and the losing one female);
see also Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232, 239-40 (Pa. 1996) (approving medical
monitoring for men with asymptomatic pleural thickening).
141. Bernstein, supra note 4, at 360.
142. See cases cited supra note 101; see also Henderson & Twerski, supra note 93, at
838 (identifying a rejectionist trend).
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he must live each day with the uncertainty of whether the disease is
present in his body. If, however, he is able to take advantage of medical
monitoring and the monitoring detects no evidence of the disease, then,
at least for the time being, the plaintiff can receive the comfort of peace
of mind. Moreover, even if medical monitoring did detect evidence of
an irreversible and untreatable disease, the plaintiff might still achieve
some peace of mind through this knowledge by getting his financial
affairs in order, making lifestyle changes, and, even perhaps, making
peace with estranged loved ones or with his religion.143
Quite a pricey dose of emotional succor when the toxic substance at
issue is so notorious for the costly aggregation it generates. As Justice
Breyer observed in Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v Buckley,
costs to defendants do not stop with the modest demand of Buckley to
receive only "$950 annually for 36 years'" because paying him would
require consideration of the "tens of millions of individuals [who] may
have suffered exposure to substances that might justify some form of
substance-exposure-related medical monitoring."'" Because of
scarcity, moreover, lump-sum medical-monitoring damages for an
uninjured person jeopardize the opportunity for a person stricken with
mesothelioma or asbestosis (like the wife-launderer with whom we
began)45 to recover a compensatory award in full.'46
D Generous Statutes ofLnimtation
Physical harms caused by asbestos exposure take at least years, if
not decades, to manifest; statutes of limitation for negligence (and
products liability) actions run short. Thus one might have thought
most persons exposed to asbestos at work would be out of luck in
court. Not so. As the products liability scholars James Henderson, Jr.,
and Aaron Twerski have documented, courts granted these (mostly
male) plaintiffs' numerous exemptions from statutory deadlines-not
only more time to file, but reprieve from procedural rules that would
143. Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 97-3188, pp. 1-2 (La. 7/8/98); 716 So. 2d
355, 363 (Calogero, C.J., concurring).
144. 521 U.S. at 442.
145. See supm Part II.A.
146. Victor E. Schwartz, Leah Lorber & Emily J. Laird, Medical Monitoing: The
Right Way and the Wmng Way, 70 Mo. L. REv. 349, 376 n. 166 (2005) ("[T]he filing of mass
screening cases is tantamount to a race to the courthouse and has the effect of depleting
funds, some already stretched to the limit, which would otherwise be available for
compensation to deserving plaintiffs." (quoting In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI),
No. MDL 875,2002 WL 32151574, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16,2002))).
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have forced them to recite in one pleading all the injuries they ascribed
to the defendants' conduct or products.147
For observers of this judicial largesse, a useful comparator to
asbestos exposure is childhood sexual abuse, because gender pervades
both examples. The majority of persons who report child sexual abuse
are female; the large majority of offenders are male.148 Gender is also
present in unclaimed injuries: experts believe that young male victims
are relatively unlikely to report sexual abuse.149
Child sexual abuse victims who file tort claims years after being
assaulted face a host of difficulties in court.' Although these burdens
have been eased in recent years, legislatures, rather than judges, did the
law-reform work related to limitation periods.'' One can scarcely
imagine a category of tort claims more deserving of extra time to file.
Victims often do not understand what they experienced; at the time of
harm, they cannot grasp the long-term consequences of an assault, and
they face an aggressor who at a minimum has power over them-if not
devastating power, as is the case when parents or guardians commit the
abuse-sufficient to delay both discovery of the injury and the sense
of grievance needed to protest in court.'52
Nevertheless, most judges have held claimants to the narrow
terms of the statute. Tolling runs only until these persons reach
majority, whereupon the limitation period ensues. Typically this period
runs two or three years, after which the law extinguishes the claim.'
147. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 93, at 848-49.
148. See Child Sexual Abuse: What Parents Should Know, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL
Ass'N, https://www.apa.org/pilfamilies/resources/child-sexual-abuse.aspx (last visited May 6,
2014).
149. As one psychologist put the point, "Big boys still don't cry." Karyl McBride,
Why Boys Do Not Tell About Sexual Abuse, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Nov. 12, 2011),
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-legacy-distorted-love/201 111/why-boys-do-not-
tell-about-sexual-abuse.
150. See Doe 76C v. Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis, 817 N.W2d 150, 170-
72 (Minn. 2012) (surveying decisional law to conclude that the plaintiff's hypothesis about
repressed memory lacked scientific validity); Myrna S. Raeder, Distrusting Young Children
Who Allege Sexual Abuse: Why Stereotypes Dont Die and Ways To Facilitate Cild
Testimony, 16 WIDENER L. REv. 239, 239 (2010) (exposing the difficulties of bringing claims
as a child as well). Elsewhere I argue that stereotypes about women-including "crazy,"
"predatory," "vengeful," and otherwise unreliable-worsen this phenomenon for female
complainants. Anita Bernstein, Whath Wrong with Stereotyping., 55 ARIZ. L. REv 655, 698-
99 (2013) (reporting evidence that accusations of sexual abuse are met with disproportionate
skepticism).
151. Bernstein, supm note 150, at 717.
152. Marci A. Hamilton, The Time Has Come for a Restatement ofChild Sex Abuse,




Several state legislatures have liberalized this judicial severity by
lengthening the limitation period, codifying a window of time in which
stale claims revive and can be prosecuted or turning on the limitation
clock later with the help of a discovery rule for accrual.'54
Yet even though the harm of child sexual abuse has been going
on far longer than the harm of workplace asbestos exposure, statutory
reforms to benefit child plaintiffs were followers rather than leaders.
Legislatures installed these liberalizations for mass tort claims,
including asbestos claims, before they considered applying the same
innovation to child sexual abuse.' Furthermore, most states have
enacted no such reprieves for sexual-abuse plaintiffs.' Because men
are grossly overrepresented among offenders and underrepresented
among persons who become sexual-abuse plaintiffs (even though men,
as was just mentioned, are harmed by child sexual abuse to a greater
extent than tort liability can know), the cui bono?/cuipacat? question
has a clear answer where gender meets short and stringently applied
statutes of limitation that inhibit tort claiming for child sexual abuse in
most states. Men, in the aggregate, benefit; women, in the aggregate,
pay.
E Access to Counsel
Asbestos plaintiffs' lawyers have received attention for their avid
pursuit of new clients. Their recruitment efforts built a big roster of
what a federal court once called "inventory"'-some fraction of
whom (one might say "of which") had been exposed only slightly to
asbestos or not at all, or exposed but not harmed, or harmed but not so
severely as their attorneys went on to allege.' For decades judges,
154. Marci Hamilton collects updates on these fronts at a Web site called www.sol-
reform.com.
155. Hamilton, supra note 152, at 402 & n.20 (citing Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 197 v. WR.
Grace & Co., 752 F. Supp. 286 (D. Minn. 1990); 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 109
Cal. Rptr. 2d 611, 633 (Ct. App. 2001); In re"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F Supp.
740, 811-12 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., Inc., 534 A.2d 272,
276-77 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1079-80 (N.Y
1989)) ("[This response] was not invented for child sex abuse cases. The idea was initially
tested to address mass torts, for example, chemical or asbestos, in Delaware, New York,
Minnesota, and California.").
15 6. Id.
157. Huber v. Taylor, 469 F3d 67, 70 (3d Cir. 2006).
158. Lester Brickman has developed this point at length. See, e.g., Brickman, supra
note 19, at 1833-34; see also Lester Brickman, On the Theory Classk Theories ofAsbestos
Litigation: The Disconnect Between Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REv 33, 59-63
(2004) (identifying "The Phenomenon of the Unimpaired Claimant").
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academics, and journalists have been condemning the energetic
entrepreneurship of the asbestos plaintiffs' bar.'"
Here I propose a different look at this pursuit, a client's
perspective. Deserving or not, a group of persons who believed they
were wrongly injured received the legal help they needed to gain relief.
The rhetoric around asbestos law seems to think of male asbestos
workers as duped, manipulated simpletons;'" but there is no reason to
doubt they valued the assistance and support they enjoyed. Lawyers
helped them get money. Injured persons who are female lack
comparable--or even adequate-access to counsel.''
1. Mass Screenings
In the mid-1980s, plaintiffs' lawyers pioneered the practice of
equipping a van with radiographic machines and driving it to a factory.
This vehicle, sometimes dubbed an "examobile," allowed them to offer
a free X-ray to any worker over the age they set.' Accepting X-rays
required the workers to sign retainers agreeing to be represented
should the screening reveal an asbestos-related disease.' A radiologist
hired by the recruiting lawyer would peer at the images collected,
looking for evidence of pathologies associated with asbestos. In this
way, mass screenings of asymptomatic individuals, aided by medical
personnel, facilitated the recruitment of clients.
159. Bernstein, supm note 5, at 692-94; Anita Bernstein, Lecture, The Enterpise of
Liability, 39 VAL. U. L. REv. 27, 32-34 (2004).
160. See, eg., Huber, 469 F3d at 82 (noting the labeling of asbestos plaintiffs as
"inventory" that lawyers hold); Olson, supm note 91 (suggesting that the testimony of
coached asbestos plaintiffs resembles "identically worded essays" turned in by an entire class
of schoolchildren).
161. Many conditions contribute to this disparity. See Bernstein, supra note 109, at
171-72 (reporting the opinion of plaintiffs' lawyer Sybil Shainwald that women's injuries
have been priced too cheaply); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Texas Two-Step:
Evidence on the Link Between Damage Caps and Access to the Civil Justice System, 55
DEPAUL L. REv. 635, 661 (2006) (blaming tort reform, especially caps on noneconomic
damages); Sara Parikh, How the Spider Catches the Fly: Referal Networks in the Plaintiffs'
Personal lnufuy Bar, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 243, 260 (2006/07) (reporting that female
personal injury lawyers have trouble navigating referral networks in "the male bastion of the
personal injury bar"); Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal Versus Reality Mn Third-Party Liigation
Financing, 8 J.L. EcoN. & PoL'Y 593, 598 (2012) ("Oftentimes, the expected compensatory
awards for low-wealth plaintiffs are low due to the low economic damages arising from their
modest incomes. As a result, the expected contingency fees will be too low to induce
attorneys to take such cases on contingency.").





Screenings did more than build "inventory"; they provided
workers with a valuable service. One business-magazine story scoffed
at the statement made by a well-known member of the asbestos
plaintiffs' bar about their value: "If I have a disease, I want to know
about it'" the Dallas lawyer Fred Baron said, "and I want to be able to
seek treatment for it."" Not really, retorted Fortune in 2002.1" Of the
three major diseases that screening by "examobile" can catch,
mesothelioma and asbestosis are incurable and X-rays identify lung
cancer too late to improve survival rates.' This client-recruitment
device persisted for a couple of years after the Fortune story, but
received a knockout punch in 2005. Janis Jack, a judge who managed
silica-exposure claims in Houston, concluded that her court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction-and also said she thought plaintiffs'
lawyers deserved to be sanctioned-after determining that numerous
claims for silicosis aggregated in her court rested on egregious
misdiagnoses that had followed lawyer-sponsored screenings."' The
toxin in question was different, but the reasoning of In re Silica
Products Liability Ligation pertained to asbestos-exposure mass
screening. Plaintiffs' lawyers abandoned the practice."
Yet the intervention was not idle for workers screened by
enterprising lawyers. These persons received not just medical attention
(of dubious benefit, we may agree) but also counsel. The more
workers' X-ray results enriched lawyers, the more attorney time got
steered into this effort, and by the time mass screening ended, the
enterprise of asbestos liability had matured. The undertaking-and
from there, access to counsel-kept moving forward after skepticism
turned off the mass-screenings engine.
2. Help from Labor Unions
When researchers examined Securities and Exchange
Commission filings, they found "particularly high unionization rates"
164. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). But see Griffin B. Bell, Asbestos & the
Sleephg Consdtudon, 31 PEPP. L. REv 1, 5 (2004) ("There often is no medical purpose for
these screenings and claimants receive no medical follow-up.").
165. Parloff, supounote 162.
16 6. Id
167. In e Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 563, 673-79 (S.D. Tex. 2005). Of
the many plaintiffs' lawyers whose silica misconduct was known to her, Judge Jack imposed
sanctions on the one firm where her court had jurisdiction. Id.
168. Elise Gelinas, Comment, Asbestos Faud Should Lead to Farness: Why
Congress Should Enact the Furness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Ac, 69 MD. L. REV. 162,
188 (2009).
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among firms that chose bankruptcy in the wake of asbestos liability.'"
Unsurprising, because many of these defendant businesses had
engaged in manufacturing, and manufacturing has long been a locus of
relatively successful labor organization efforts.' More than mere
correlation is present, however.
Labor unions worked alongside plaintiffs' lawyers in the
recruitment of clients. As two railroad lawyers reported with some
dismay in 1985, labor unions had then become "active in instituting a
great deal of asbestos litigation brought in behalf of retired and
presently working employees of the railroad industry.""' Machinists,
electricians, and other unionized groups would put out the word
through newsletters that a mobile X-ray unit was coming to town.72
Plaintiffs' lawyers could have done some of their recruiting alone,
but unions gave the effort valuable support."' Communication with
prospective clients had posed challenges in the pre-Internet era during
which worker screening flourished. 74 Union leaders bridged a gap for
entrepreneurship in the plaintiffs' bar. They knew which workers
could profitably be screened; they could inform these workers where
and when mobile units would appear; and their role helped insulate
lawyers from complaints about solicitation in violation of professional
responsibility rules."'
169. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Jonathan M. Orszag & Peter R. Orszag, The Impact of
Asbestos Liabilities on Workers m Bankrupt Firms, HEARTLAND INST. 22 (Dec. 2002),
http://heartland.org/sites/all/modules/custom/heartland-migration/files/pdfs/1 1543.pdf.
17 0. Id.
171. John C. Corrigan & Craig J. Whitney, Asbestos Ligation Under the FEL.A., 20
FORUM 580, 580 (1984-1985). Sounding irked, the authors go on to suggest that unions "may
have had an independent duty to warn their members of the dangers of asbestos" and perhaps
"should be joined by third-party action," id., but their article never returns to this idea.
172. Id
173. Some judicial condemnations of mass screenings of asymptomatic workers list
unions rather than lawyers first on their roster of culpable actors. See, e.g., Owens Corning v.
Credit Suisse First Bos., 322 B.R. 719, 723 (D. Del. 2005) ("Labor unions, attorneys, and
other persons with suspect motives caused large numbers of people to undergo X-ray
examinations ... thus triggering thousands of claims by persons who had never experienced
adverse symptoms."); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Am. Emp'rs Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 1053,
1057 (D. Mass. 1989) (referring to "mass X-ray screenings at occupational locations
conducted by unions and/or plaintiffs' attorneys"). See generalyBrickman, supm note 158,
at 73-78 (contrasting client-recruitment efforts that included and excluded union
participation).
174. The Internet must be pretty good for client recruitment, if search-engine pricing
is any guide. See Barry Schwartz, Mesothelioma, Asbestos, Annuity: Googlet Most
Expensive Keywods, SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Nov. 9, 2012, 12:49 PM), http://searchengine
land.com/mesothelioma-asbestos-annuity-googles-most-expensive-keywords-139295.
175. See Roger C. Cramton, Lawyer Ethics on the Lunar Landscape of Asbestos
Litdgadon, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 175, 182 (2004) (arguing that union participation made what
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Like screenings themselves, union participation helped asbestos-
exposed workers who wanted counsel. When recruiting lawyers
arrived on-site for a screening, union leaders answered workers'
questions about what was going on.' An individual decision about
whether to go ahead with an X-ray and the retainer agreement that
followed must have been easier to make-more comforting, better
supported-when the worker knew that he, just like his employer and
other corporate adversaries of his, now had the benefit of solidarity
and repeat-player experience. Hard to say how much the so-called
brotherhood of a labor union meant back in the screening era for an
asbestos-exposed person when his local told him that he might pursue
redress; but contemporary recruiters stick with the theme of "you're
not alone," suggesting that union membership can hold psychological
value for workers who feel vulnerable.'
3. Ready Aggregation
In the years after the Supreme Court undid two efforts to certify
classes of asbestos claimants for the purpose of settlement,'78 other
routes to aggregation have flourished. The most prominent among
these routes in federal court is multidistrict litigation (MDL), which
centralizes civil actions filed around the country in a single district
court authorized to manage pretrial proceedings.'"7  For state court
judges, the favored aggregator has been the consolidation of separately
filed actions."'
could have been deemed improper solicitation protected conduct under freedom of
association). But see Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues in Asbestos Ligation, 33 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 833, 843 (2005) ("[T]his form of solicitation violates Model Rule 7.2(b)."). The point is
almost moot because asbestos defense lawyers "do not complain about these ethical
violations," Cramton, supra, at 178, and discipline for solicitation is rare. See Anita
Bernstein, Sanctioning the Ambulance Chaser, 41 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1545 app. at 1576-83
(2008) (reporting empirical data about the offense).
176. Parloff, supra note 162.
177. In 2013, the labor union representing grocery store workers reached out to young
workers, proposing to ease their isolation and financial stress with "solidarity and being there
for each other, especially in times of need." With a Union, You're Not Alone, UFCW (June
24, 2013), http://www.ufcw.org/2013/06/24/with-a-union-youre-not-alone; see also Kendra
Coulter, Raising Retail: Organiing Retail Worke-s in Canada and the United States, 38 LAB.
STuD. J. 47, 58 (2013) (reporting organizers' embrace of this message).
178. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 859 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 629 (1997).
179. See28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
180. Jeffrey M. Davidson, Theories ofAsbestos Ligation Costs-Why Two Decades
ofProceduralReform Have Failed To Reduce Claimans'Epenses, 7 NEV. L.J. 73, 77 (2006).
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Like the class action, MDL and consolidation were created in the
name of efficiency. Judges could, in principle, clear their dockets from
the clutter of multiple related claims and move on. "At one point," the
civil procedure scholar Arthur Miller recently recalled, "I expressed the
hope that aggregation ... would be an effective way to deal with the
enormous backlog of asbestos cases in the federal courts.""' Wrong,
Miller observed,82 and wrong with respect to state-court filings as
well.
In hindsight, the perversity of aggregating asbestos claims in an
attempt to make them go away should have been foreseen. "Increased
efficiency may encourage additional filings," mused Helen Freedman,
a New York judge with deep experience in the asbestos trenches.'
Consolidating cases for trial "simply attract[s] even more claims,"'84
because using this technique "to force defendants to settle is a bit like
using a lawn mower to cut down weeds in a garden ... ultimately the
approach is likely to fuel the filing of more claims."' One mass torts
scholar put the point concisely: "If you build a superhighway, there
will be a traffic jam."'86
Like mass screenings and alliances between labor unions and
enterprising lawyers, the excesses of aggregation can be understood
not only as yet another development that helped form the infamous
"elephantine mass"' of asbestos law, but also as a source of legal
counsel for individuals. The ready aggregation of asbestos claims has
functioned as both cause and effect. Plaintiffs' lawyers recruited
clients, tried to aggregate the ones they had, received enough
encouragement from judges to keep litigating,' built a big roster that
posed a bet-the-company threat to their risk-averse adversaries, won
favorable settlements, won more clients drawn to their winning track
record, made scarier bet-the-company demands, won bigger
settlements. Rinse and repeat.
181. Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meanigful Days in Court and Tials on
the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation ofFedeal Procedure, 88 N.YU. L. REv. 286, 293
n.23 (2013).
182. See id.
183. Helen E. Freedman, Product Liability Issues in Mass Torts-View fivm the
Bench, 15 TouRo L. REv 685, 688 (1999) (recalling asbestos cases).
184. Jackson, supra note 65, at 1165.
185. Mark A. Behrens, Whath New in Asbestos Litigation., 28 REv. LmG. 501, 509-
10(2009).
186. Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use ofFederal ClassAcdons M Mass Torts,
39 Aiz. L. REV. 595, 606 (1997).
187. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999).
188. See supa Part III.A-C (reviewing doctrinal gains for asbestos plaintiffs).
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For an asbestos-exposed person who wanted a lawyer, this cycle
of escalation and profit for others meant opportunity. He had no
control over litigation strategy or outcomes, but he-in this respect
different from the large majority of individuals in the United States
with plausible legal claims--could assert his interests. If he did wish
to litigate, he could say no to the great entrepreneurial apparatus not
eager to offer him help.
Contrast injuries to women, which get aggregated now and then
but to far less profit for claimants and lawyers.'" This absence is not
explained by any lack of injury to groups of victims. Female workers,
for example, are entitled by law to equal pay and opportunity; the
Supreme Court has construed the law of employment discrimination
and federal civil procedure to deny them aggregation.' Institutional
entities are continually accused of responsibility for large numbers of
sexual assaults,'92 which more women than men experience;'93 were it
available, aggregation would transfer wealth from mostly male
offenders and male-governed institutions to mostly female victims.
Although lead paint has poisoned girls and boys alike, I have argued
that lawyers and courts tacitly classified it as female.'" This substance
would have been a perfect candidate not only for aggregation but the
inactive docket that courts created to save unripened asbestos claims.'
It has received no asbestoslike judicial favor on either front.'
Injuries gendered female are priced cheaply.' Cheap injuries
need aggregation for injured persons to gain counsel: low-dollar
189. See White, supm note 8, at 192 tbl.2 (presenting quantitative data about nine mass
torts, most of which included plaintiffs of mostly or only one gender).
190. See Equal = Pay: A Guide to Woment Equal Pay Rights, WOMEN's BUREAU,
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR (Apr. 2012), http://www.dol.gov/equalpay/equalpay-employee.pdf
(summarizing the federal law of equal employment opportunity for women). The U.S.
Census Bureau reported that in the latest year studied, 2009, full-time workers in the United
States who were male earned a median income of $56,053, while full-time workers who were
female earned about three-quarters of that sum, $43,217. Carmen DeNavas-Walt, Bernadette
D. Proctor & Jessica C. Smith, Income, Poverty and Health Insurance Covemge in the United
States: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 7 (Sept. 2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/2011 pubs/
p60-239.pdf.
191. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011).
192. See Hamilton, supm note 152, at 415-18.
193. See Bernstein, supra note 150, at 699 (reporting data).
194. Bernstein, supra note 4, at 350-51 (noting a focus on mothers as responsible for
this harm).
195. See supo note 83 and accompanying text.
196. Bernstein, supr note 4, at 348-50.
197. See supm note 161 and accompanying text.
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claims are likely to die without it.' Aggregation thus gave unimpaired
asbestos-exposed men a gain in which women did not share.
IV. CUIBONo: PECUNIARY GAINS BEYOND JUDGMENTS AND
SETTLEMENTS
We now turn from litigants who sought redress for personal
injury in court and move to asbestos law as a source of wealth in forms
other than compensation. Here "asbestos law" covers advocacy for
clients, bankruptcy law, regulatory law, and the furnishing of legal
advice to businesses. Like plaintiffs who claimed personal injury from
asbestos exposure, the persons who have profited from these other
kinds of asbestos law have been predominantly men.
A. Multiple Helpings for Mostly MaleAttorneys
The most (in)famous way to make money as an asbestos lawyer
is to represent plaintiffs. Even the well-compensated lawyers of the
1998 federal tobacco settlement received less than what their asbestos
peers collected.'" Researchers at the RAND Corporation estimated
that plaintiffs' lawyers reap 34% of recoveries in the form of fees and
spend another 7% on expenses like screenings and expert witnesses;
an informed observer believes both percentages are a bit higher.2"
Client advocacy occurs on the other side too. RAND found that
defense transaction costs-lawyers' fees and litigation expenses-
consumed about 31% of total spending on asbestos liability in the
years 1983 to 2001-more than $21 billion, about a billion dollars
more than plaintiffs' lawyers made.20' Informants told RAND that they
expected these defense-side figures, which have fluctuated over the
years, to go up in the twenty-first century, at least in the short term.202
Men reap much more than women of the defense lawyers' profits.203
In addition to prosecuting and defending personal injury claims,
asbestos law offers a third category of lucrative employment for
lawyers, overlapping in large measure with plaintiff advocacy: trustee
198. See STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & MARGARET YK. Woo, LmGATING IN AMERICA: CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN CONTEXT 200-01 (2006) (making this point in defense of class actions).
199. White, supm note 8, at 195.
200. Brickman, supo note 175, at 841-42.
201. Carroll et al., supra note 6, at 95-96.
202. Id. at 96-97.
203. The National Association for Law Placement, which has been monitoring the
demographics of law firm partners since 1993, reports that equity partners in large law firms
are about 85% male, consistent with a long-standing pattern. The Demogaphics ofEquity-
An Update, NALP (Feb. 2013), http://www.nalp.org/demographicsfoLequity.update.
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work inside entities put into bankruptcy by asbestos liability.
Numerous entities, made insolvent by judgments and claims against
them, have taken shelter in federal bankruptcy law, typically Chapter
11. In the summer of 2004, RAND researchers counted seventy-three
asbestos-entity defendants that had either dissolved or filed for
reorganization.2 " Other businesses have joined this roster in the last
decade.20 These data provide a picture of cui bono with respect to
business insolvency occasioned by asbestos law.
Section 524(g) of the United States Bankruptcy Code permits a
debtor-entity to establish a trust to control and pay for personal injury
and property damage claims related to asbestos exposure. 2 6 Because
protection of creditors' interests is central to bankruptcy reorganization
and asbestos plaintiffs are creditors, plaintiffs' lawyers have a strong
voice in corporate governance when a debtor enters Chapter 11 ;207 they
are especially prominent in § 524(g) trusts. A RAND study of the
twenty-six most active asbestos trusts identified the nine law firms
most often represented in trust administration.20 Ranks one through
seven of these top nine were held by plaintiffs' firms.
Inside trusts, plaintiffs' lawyers are active. They serve as trustees
who manage the trust investments and stand in the debtor's place
during litigation209 and as members of trust advisory committees,
which advocate for claimants' interests under conditions of scarcity.210
204. Carroll et al., supra note 6, at 109.
205. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABiLYTY OFFICE, GAO- 11-819, ASBESTOS INJURY COMPENSA-
ToN: THE ROLE AND ADMINISTRATION OF ASBESTOS TRUSTS 2 (2011) (counting approxi-
mately 100 corporate bankruptcies attributable to asbestos liability); Mark D. Plevin, Leslie
A. Davis & Tacie H. Yoon, Wher Are They Now Part Six: An Update on Developments in
Asbestos-Related Bankruptcy Cases, 11 MEALEY'S ASBESTOS BANKR. REP., no. 1, 2012, at 1,
17-18 chart 1 (adding twenty-two bankruptcy filings made after 2005 to the U.S. corporate
bankruptcy roster).
206. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I) (2012).
207. The statute requires approval of the bankruptcy reorganization plan from 75% of
current asbestos plaintiffs before the debtor can receive a "channeling injunction" from the
bankruptcy court, directing all claims for exposure to the trust rather than the courts. Id
§ 524(g)(2)(B); see also Roger Parloff, Welcome to the NewAsbestos Scandal, CNNMONEY
(Sept. 6, 2004), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/2004/09/06/380311
("Since bankruptcy is worthless to an asbestos defendant if the company can't get a
channeling injunction, the asbestos claimants-or to be more precise, the plaintiffs lawyers
who control 75% of them-effectively have more power than the bankruptcy judge!").
208. Lloyd Dixon, Geoffrey McGovern & Amy Coombe, Asbestos Bankruptcy Trusts:
An Overview of Trust Structure and Activity with Detailed Reports on the Largest Tusts;
INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, RAND, at xvi tbl.5.2 (2010), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/
pubs/technicaLreports/2010/RANDTR872.pdf.




Fees for this work can be high,21' but more significant inside the trusts
is power. Plaintiffs' lawyers write generous criteria for compensation
in trust instruments,2 12 for example, and to some observers, they have
manifested inadequate concern for curbing fraudulent claims and
double-collecting by the same plaintiffs from different trusts-an
indifference that, if it exists, enriches these individuals. 21 3 Few women
sit at this bounteous table.
B. Gains from Regulatory Compliance
OSHA, as was noted, responded relatively quickly to the problem
of asbestos exposure: one of the first actions the agency took was to
set maximum particle levels in the workplace. 214 The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and the Consumer Product Safety
Commission also regulate asbestos,215 as do laws enacted in every
216
state. While enhancing safety and ameliorating environmental harm,
statutes and regulations also expand employment opportunities in a
gendered pattern.
One description of "asbestos abatement worker," for example,
states a median income of $17 an hour2"-right in the middle for men
211. Id. at 13 (giving, as examples from trust instruments, $500 an hour or annual
compensation, typically between $60,000 and $75,000 a year, plus hourly compensation for
travel).
212. Exposure standards for some asbestos trusts permit compensation for individuals
"who did not work directly with or even in the same buildig as an asbestos-containing
product." Brown, supra note 138, at 562.
213. Introduced in the United States House of Representatives in 2013, the Furthering
Asbestos Claim Transparency Act seeks to mandate more public disclosure from asbestos
trusts. H.R. 982, 113th Cong. (2013). See generally U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
supra note 205, at 31-33 (reporting the debate in neutral terms).
214. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
215. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE
EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 6 (1995).
See generally Jennifer L. Leonardi, Its Still Here! The Conthnng Battle over Asbestos in
Amienca, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 129, 144-45 (2005) (summarizing federal regulation).
216. Robert D. Brownson, Kristi K. Warner & Jessie E. Rosenthal, Current and
Historcal Amercan Asbestos Regulations, BROWNSON & BALLOU 2 (2012), http://www.
brownsonballou.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Historical-Asbestos-Regulations-
2012.pdf.
217. Asbestos Abatement Worker/Asbestos Abatement Technicians Job Descrption,
Career as a[n] Asbestos Abatement Worker/Asbestos Abatement Technicians, Salary
Employment-Definition and Nature of the Work, Education and Trahnng Requirements,
Getting the Job, STATEUNIVERSITY.COM, http://careers.stateuniversity.com/pages/7769/
Asbestos-Abatement-Worker-Asbestos-Abatement-Technicians.html (last visited May 6,
2014) [hereinafter AsbestosAbatement Workel.
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who hold the high school diploma demanded,2 " but about a third more
than the median hourly wage for a female high school graduate. 219 The
job reads masculine. Technicians "use different types of hand and
power tools" and "handle myriad varieties of heavy machineries."20
"Fundamental knowledge of mathematics is required while performing
conversions and calculations to neutralize contaminants," the
description adds.22' "Since the work area concerns buildings, a
background in construction can often be helpful."222
Higher up the educational ladder, asbestos regulation has
generated more varied occupational opportunities. OSHA standard
setting enlists scientific expertise in establishing airborne asbestos
maximums and technologies for measuring compliance. 223  The
Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986 mandated
inspection of all U.S. school buildings for this substance;224 a
reauthorization act added the demand of accreditation of individuals
who inspect for and remove asbestos in a variety of buildings.225 For
ideas about workplace maximum levels, state governments frequently
defer to a trade group, the American Conference of Governmental
Industrial Hygienists, which has been promulgating what it calls
"threshold limit values" for asbestos since 1946.226 One state,
California, empowers several agencies-the state counterpart to
OSHA, a department of toxic substances control, a contractors' license
board, and local air pollution control districts-to set and enforce
standards.227 State regulation is permitted, if not encouraged, by federal
law: unlike some other federal agencies, OSHA takes an antipre-
emption stance, 228 and the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act
218. Table 4.15: Hourly Wages of Men, by Education, 1973-2011 (2011 Dollars),
EcoN. POLICY INST., http://stateofworkingamerica.org/chart/swa-wages-table-4-15-hourly-
wages-men-education (last updated May 14, 2012) (listing the median real hourly wage for
male high school graduates as $17.53 in 2011).
219. Table 4.16: Hourly Wages of Women, by Education, 1973-2011 (2011 Dollars),
EcoN. POLICY INST., http://stateofworkingamerica.org/chart/swa-wages-table-4-16-hourly-
wages-women/ (last updated May 14, 2012) (listing the median real hourly wage for female
high school graduates at $13.83 in 2011).
220. Asbestos Abatement Worker, supra note 217.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Brownson, Warner & Rosenthal, supm note 216, at 7-8.
224. 15 U.S.C. § 2643 (2012).
225. Asbestos School Hazard Abatement Reauthorization Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-637, § 15, 104 Stat. 4589, 4596-97.
226. Brownson, Warner & Rosenthal, supr note 216, at 14.
227. Id. at 18-20.
228. See, e.g, Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, The New
Formahsm, and the Separdtion ofPowels Revisited Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of
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expressly invites states to promulgate stricter standards regulating
asbestos in schools.29 Asbestos law functions as a white-collar job
creator for an array of compliance tasks.
More job creation emerges from the partial and incomplete
nature of asbestos prohibitions. In contrast to more than thirty other
countries, the United States has not codified a comprehensive ban of
this substance.23 0 Instead, statutes like the Clean Air Act, the Consumer
Product Safety Act, and the Toxic Substances Control Act declare
asbestos an unlawful ingredient or constituent in particular products.23'
A patchy, rather than a total, ban necessarily generates work for
individuals charged with observing or policing the line between
permitted and prohibited uses of this substance.
Underrepresented in upper management, engineering at all levels,
and jobs that reward knowledge of chemistry, geology, hydraulics, and
materials science,23 women are absent from this white-collar work in a
pattern similar to their exclusion from the unskilled and semiskilled
asbestos-exposing occupations of past decades.233 The deadliness of
asbestos jobs has (to the great credit of asbestos law) lessened
dramatically. The gender exclusion, not so much.
V. CUIPACAT: PECUNIARY LOSSES
The enrichments of asbestos law described in the last Part came
at a cost. Cui pacat at the collective level for asbestos liability, and
how much, is an empirical question that has received little study from
researchers-curiously little in relation to the vast consensus that
Psidential Overight of State-Government Officers Enforcing Fedeal Law, 61 DuKE L.J.
1599, 1630 (2012) (noting that OSHA has always been willing to defer to well-enforced state
occupational safety standards); Letter from Deborah Greenfield, Acting Deputy Solicitor, to
Les Weisbrod, President of the Am. Ass'n for Justice, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR (Feb. 3, 2010),
https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show-document?p-table=INTERPRETATIONS
&pjid=28049 (declaring an OSHA position against preemption).
229. See 15 U.S.C. § 2649(c) ("Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed or
interpreted as preempting a State from establishing any additional liability or more stringent
requirements with respect to asbestos in school buildings within such State.").
230. Leonardi, supm note 215, at 130.
231. US. Federal Bans on Asbestos, EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/asbestos/us-federal-
bans-asbestos (last updated Mar. 16, 2014).
232. See David Beede et al., Econ. & Statistics Admin., Women m STEM A Gender
Gap to Innovation, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE (Aug. 2011), http://www.esa.doc.gov/sites/
default/files/reports/documents/womeninstemagaptoinnovation8311 .pdf.
233. See Kingsley R. Browne, Biological Sex Differences m the Workplace: Reports
of the "End of Men" Are Greatly Exaggemted (As Are Clains of Women.t Continued
Inequality), 93 B.U. L. REv. 769, 790-94 (2013) (reporting low levels of female employment
in both white-collar science and technology jobs and blue-collar, historically male ones).
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asbestos has done great harm to the American economy. Seeking
facts, this Part starts with the asbestos bankruptcy record noted in Part
IV Corporate bankruptcies do not account for all the pecuniary losses
that asbestos law installed;234 they also are not coterminous with
financial distress. Nevertheless, this category features distinct and
illustrative detriments that women must pacat alongside men, the
gender cui bono from asbestos law.
A. Creditois ofInsolvent Defendants
As soon as an asbestos defendant files its bankruptcy petition, the
cuipacat or suffering, cohort includes all creditors that lack a security
(or otherwise legally privileged) interest in it. Secured credit, as one
bankruptcy scholar wryly noted, amounts to "an agreement between A
and B that C take nothing."235 Individuals and entities that never set out
to establish a credit relationship with a corporate debtor pacat for
asbestos law in the form of lowered priority for repayment of what the
debtor owes them.
The losses are diffuse.236 Examples of reluctant creditors of
debtors in bankruptcy include utility companies, victims of business
torts, victims of antitrust violations and intellectual-property
infringement, environmental agencies performing cleanups, and other
governmental agencies such as taxing authorities and pensions-benefit
guarantors.23 Asbestos debtors always owe money to more than
current and future personal injury claimants;238 some creditors are the
reluctant kind.239 Moreover, because a § 524(g) trust must contain
234. For example, mergers and acquisitions likely failed to occur because prospective
acquirers were turned off by the risk of future claims posed by their targets' past operations.
See Stiglitz, Orszag & Orszag, supra note 169, at 42. Some of these changes in corporate
form by hypothesis would have generated value. See Brickman, supra note 158, at 37 n. 10
("[T]he large uncertainty surrounding asbestos liabilities has impeded transactions that, if
completed, would have benefited companies, their stockholders and employees, and the
economy as a whole." (quoting the United States Senate testimony, S. REP. No. 108-118, at 25
(2003), of a managing director of Goldman Sachs (internal quotation marks omitted))).
235. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditork Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887, 1899
(1994).
236. I thank Lester Brickman and Ted Janger for their stimulating thoughts on this
point.
237. LoPucki, supra note 235, at 1896-97.
238. See, e.g., Gary T. Pakulski, Missteps and Dissensions-OC Bankuptcy
Documents Reveal Rifts Inside Fm, Among Creditors, TOLEDO BLADE (Dec. 8, 2002),
http://www.toledoblade.comlocal/2002/12/08/OC-bankruptcy-documents-reveal-rifts-inside-
firm-among-creditors.html (noting an assertion by rival creditors that the Owens Corning
bankruptcy reorganization unduly favored asbestos claimants).
239. Reluctant creditors are often heard from in the context of prepackaged
bankruptcies, wherein dominant creditors approve a reorganization plan before the plan is
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more than half the debtor's assets,2 under the scarcity that is always
present in a bankruptcy reorganization, reluctant creditors become
worse off whenever such a trust forms.241' By transferring wealth in
favor of (mostly male) exposed persons and their (mostly male)
lawyers, asbestos law takes money from groups likely to include or
impact women.
B. Insurers and Their Customers
Although insurers profited from having sold defense and
indemnity policies to businesses that went on to become defendants,242
asbestos law has imposed burdens on them. With respect to personal
injury claims, courts have interpreted occurrence-based comprehen-
sive general liability policies favorably to asbestos plaintiffs and
unfavorably to insurers. Exposure in year 1 with a diagnosis of a
disease like asbestosis in year 30 typically permits an exposed person
to collect on a liability policy that covered the firm for liability-
generating occurrences in year 1, year 30, or any year in between.243
This opportunity to reach multiple sources of coverage comes from the
judicial conclusion that asbestos fibers, once inhaled, continuously
injure the lungs.24 Insurers also have been unable to enforce the
aggregate limits they thought they had imposed on coverage through
their contracts.2 45
With respect to corporate reorganization in bankruptcy, asbestos
law developments have made insurers pacatin additional ways. Recall
that a § 524(g) trust permits a debtor to obtain from the bankruptcy
court a channeling injunction that sends all asbestos personal injury
presented to the bankruptcy court. See EUGENE E BRIGHAM & PHILLIP R. DAVES,
INTERMEDIATE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 955 (11th ed. 2013) (describing the "cramdown"
phenomenon). On prepackaged asbestos bankruptcies, see inih1 notes 247-248 and
accompanying text.
240. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(III) (2012).
241. Queena Sook Kim, Firms Hit by Asbestos Ligation Take Bankruptcy Route,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2000, at B4 (observing that typically an asbestos trust will hold much
more than the statutory minimum of 51% of a debtor's assets).
242. See Jeffrey W Stempel, Assessing the Coverage Carnage: Asbestos Liabilityand
Insurance Alter Three Decades of Dispute, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 349, 350-51 (2006) (arguing
that insurers' experiences of asbestos liability have been mixed rather than ruinous); id at 417
(stating that even for insurers that have paid out the highest sums, asbestos claims present no
more than a 6% "drag on earnings").
243. White, supra note 8, at 193-94.
244. Id
245. Stempel, supra note 242, at 381-406; White, supm note 8, at 194 (observing that
when courts characterized policies as applying to premises rather than products, they declared
that "insurers effectively have unlimited liability").
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claims, present and future, to the trust rather than the courts for
resolution.246 The trust-and-channeling-injunction option for a debtor
disadvantages insurers. They hold less power to fight claims
channeled to a trust than they would if they could litigate in court;
moreover, being compelled to fund a trust increases at least the speed
at which they have to pay on their liability policies and probably the
total of these payouts as well.247
Disadvantages to insurers grow more acute with prepackaged
Chapter 11 reorganization.24 8 Personal injury creditors who can figure
out workable terms of a bankruptcy before the filing of a petition can
enlist the debtor-defendant in an alliance against the interests of
insurers.249 Consistent with the rest of asbestos liability, the "prepack"
wars, between reluctant creditors-mostly insurers-on one side and
lawyers representing plaintiff-creditors on the other, came out
favorably to the plaintiffs' bar, at least at first.250 Courts concluded that
an asbestos reorganization plan is "insurance neutral" if it does not
worsen the position of an insurer compared to where it stood
prepetition,25 ' and deeming a plan insurance-neutral means that
insurers lack standing to object to it in bankruptcy court.252 A couple of
hard-fought cases did lessen this gain for plaintiffs' lawyers in 2011
and 2012. Insurers persuaded two federal appellate courts that the
particulars of two reorganization plans lacked the neutrality needed to
defeat standing.2 " The prepack tide may have turned in favor of
insurers.
246. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
247. Stempel, supra note 242, at 420-21.
248. See BRIGHAM & DAvEs, supra note 239, at 955 (describing prepackaged
bankruptcy).
249. Parloff, supra note 207 ("Instead of working together to resist and defend claims,
in a prepack the insured and the plaintiffs['] attorney work together to force the insurer to pay
as much as possible." (quoting an unnamed general counsel of an insurance company
(internal quotation marks omitted))).
250. S. Todd Brown, Section 524(g) Without Compromise: Voting Rjghts and the
Asbestos Bankruptcy Paradox, 2008 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 841, 868-69.
251. Jennifer Kent, Comment, Quality Not Quantity: The Implications ofRedefming
Insurance Neutrality in In re Global Industrial Technologies, Inc., 53 B.C. L. REv. 345, 349
(2012).
252. See In ra Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 E3d 190, 214-15 (3d Cir. 2004); Fuller-
Austin Insulation Co. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716, 725 (Ct. App. 2006).
253. In a Thorpe Insulation Co., 677 E3d 869, 885-86 (9th Cir. 2012); In ra Global
Indus. Techs., Inc., 645 E3d 201, 215 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). In ra Global Industrinal
Technologies, a five-to-four en banc decision with a strong dissent, was especially hard-
fought. For a close reading of this decision and the case law that preceded it, see Peter I.
Tsoflias, Insurance Neutrality: Afecting an Insurerk Rikht to Bankruptcy Standing, 37 DEL.
J. COR. L. 569 (2012).
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And yet insurance neutrality as a standing suppressant, even
when applied carefully, effects a shift in pecuniary advantage
reminiscent of the moves explored in Parts II through IV of this
Article. Any asbestos bankruptcy trust establishes gains for claimants
and their lawyers at the expense of entities that wrote and sold liability
insurance policies. Harm to insurers may be a good thing, but it is not
insurance-neutral. Denying cuipacaton this point not only conceals a
shift of wealth but undermines the bankruptcy norm of mutual
sacrifice and parity among creditors at the same tier.254
Because the insurance business runs on spreading detriments to
customers, the burdens that asbestos law has imposed on insurers
generate higher prices for premiums. Judicial determinations that an
insurer lacks standing to challenge a bankruptcy plan, as noted
above,"' can be counted on to drive up this cost.256 Tort reformers have
been stating variations on this association between liability and the
cost of insurance for decades. Their effort reaped especially dramatic
results in the statehouses with respect to medical care: too much tort
liability, they told receptive audiences, makes malpractice coverage
unavailable for physicians.257 Observers who disagree about the
relation between insurance and the supply of medical services do not
quarrel with the truism that more liability exposure for an insurer
raises prices for policyholders. And so anyone who buys insurance of
any kind sold by insuring entities that faced asbestos liability exposure
or who pays for the goods and services that corporate policyholders
sell is among those cuipacat258
254. Brown, supra note 250, at 860-61.
255. See supra notes 250-252 and accompanying text.
256. Tsoflias, supra note 253, at 589.
257. See generally Jessica Wolpaw Reyes & Ren6 Reyes, The Effects of Malpractice
Liability on Obstetrics and Gynecology: Takmig the Measure of a Crisis, 47 NEw ENG. L.
REv. 315 (2012) (studying the issue from the perspective of physician behavior); Joseph
Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races" The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform
Process, 27 Hous. L. REv. 207, 218-19 (1990) (surveying tort reform legislation enacted
between 1985 and 1988 in almost every state in response to an identified insurance crisis).
258. while this Article was going to press, affronted policyholders showed how an
insurance payout can feel like an injury to the premium buyer cui pacat. Individuals and
entities protested the compulsory coverage of particular health care interventions. See, e.g.,
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1144-45 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 permits corporate employers to object to
insurance mandates), cert grante4 134 S. Ct. 678 (Nov. 26, 2013) (No. 13-354); Kirk
Johnson, In Washington, Abortion Debate Counters Treng N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/us/washington-state-abortion-debate-counters-the-trend.html
(reporting on the controversy over the inclusion of abortion in health insurance coverage).
Premium buyers seldom focus this way on who receives payouts distributed by their insurers,
but they are always free to do so. Corporate policyholders and their customers can think of
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C The Larger Population
Recall that the gains of asbestos law include access to counsel."'
Once lawyers managed to aggregate them into big cohorts of plaintiffs,
unimpaired workers became numerous enough to overwhelm judicial
dockets and threaten the solvency of the businesses their lawyers
named as defendants. Successes begat more successes for persons
exposed to asbestos at work and the lawyers who shaped and shared in
their gains. The counsel that located these persons through recruitment
and aggregation had no time to give these clients advice or meet their
individual needs,2" but even the most remote, inventory-minded
lawyer, when he succeeded-a frequent result"'-won clients money
and vindication for the wrong of exposure.
The pacat trade-off for this bono included, for openers, a
diverting of representation. Lawyers who took on asbestos defendants
may have been known for their energy,262 but their day contained only
the quotidian twenty-four hours. Asbestos work made them less
accessible to other prospective clients. Researchers continue to
demonstrate that plaintiffs' lawyers respond to financial incentives;263
ceteis parabus, they prefer clients and matters that pay well.
Whenever asbestos work maximizes the value of a plaintiffs' lawyer's
time, this lawyer is likely to take up that work and decline to represent
other prospective clients. Turned-away clients might find another
lawyer, but by hypothesis, their second-choice counsel benefit these
themselves as enriching or supporting asbestos plaintiffs and their lawyers, assuming their
insurers are among those that have paid into asbestos trusts.
259. See supm Part ilI.E.
260. WEINSTEIN, supm note 215, at 1.
261. See supm notes 56, 62 and accompanying text (noting studies of the patterns in
asbestos litigation).
262. Obituaries for the plaintiffs' lawyers Ron Motley and Fred Baron, for example,
reported a host of diverse activities and long workdays, along with millions of dollars earned.
John Schwartz, Ron Motley Who Tackled Big Tobacco, Dies at 68, N.Y TIMES (Aug. 22,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/23/business/ron-motley-who-tackled-big-tobacco-
dies-at-68.html; 'King of Torts'Fred Baron Dies of Cancer, DALL. Bus. J., http://www.biz
journals.com/dallas/stories/2008/10/27/daily60.html?page=all (last updated Oct. 31, 2008).
263. Two scholars published a series of papers reporting findings they drew from a
Texas data set containing reports of personal injury liability claims. See Charles Silver &
David A. Hyman, Access to Justice in a World Without Lawyeis: Evidence from Texas
Bodily Injury Clains, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 357, 360 n.17 (2010) (providing a biblio-
graphy). Silver, Hyman, and their occasional coauthors focus on issues pertinent to asbestos
liability, including aggregation, insurance, medical evidence of harm, and attorney
compensation. Id They find that curbing the percentage that lawyers can collect through
contingent-fee work reduces access to the courts for injured persons. Id at 374; see also




individuals less." Entire domains of personal injury law necessarily
shrink in response to this diversion."'
We could speculate about the great mass tort actions pushed aside
by asbestos law-against sellers of lead paint, for instance, or
institutions that could with reasonable care have prevented the sexual
abuse of children. Yet we have little idea of which wrongs and
wrongdoers would have been identified. Slam-dunk hypothetical
negligence claims with plenty of evidence, good economic value for a
lawyer, and good social effects could have existed yet never come to
court because when these claims ripened, the leaders who would
otherwise have had time to consider retaining injured clients and
protesting were too busy with asbestos.
Even if nothing is out there-even if asbestos lawyers had no
other wrongs of any interest to right-the pacat constituency remains.
It is us. Dial back the contention that asbestos liability in the United
States has been an almost unmitigated blight, reminiscent of "Credit
Mobilier, Teapot Dome, Billy Sol Estis, the salad oil scandals, the
Savings & Loan scandals, WorldCom, and Enron,"266 and start from a
more anodyne premise: tort liability in the United States is expensive;
asbestos law has been central to the costliness of this apparatus. How
expensive? One insurance consulting business has been estimating the
cost of the apparatus regularly since 1985, issuing multibillion dollar
bottom-line numbers every couple of years. Its most recent tally: for
2010, $264 billion.267 Critics raise objections to the politics and
methodologies behind these published totals and deem the numbers
too big,268 but the high cost of tort as a mechanism of compensation for
individuals is acknowledged across the American political spectrum.
264. Silver & Hyman, supm note 263, at 374 ("[Q]uality of lawyering matters as
well.").
265. Cf Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell: Intentional Har and the Quest for
Insurance Funding, 75 TEx. L. REv. 1721, 1724-25 (1997) (identifying the phenomenon of
"underlitigating," or describing intentional harms as accidental to enhance the plaintiff's
access to the defendant's liability insurance).
266. Brickman, supm note 158, at 35. If we put the contention aside, we behave
predictably to Bricknan, who has protested the absence of a consensus in the asbestos law
literature supporting his judgments. Id. at 168-69; cf Charles Silver, A Rejoinder to Lester
Bncknan: On the Theory Classs Theoies ofAsbestos Litigation, 32 PEPP. L. REv. 765, 767-
68 (2005) (noting that falsity also came from the defense side in asbestos litigation).
267. US. Tort Costs Tunds: 2011 Update, TOWERS WATSON 3 (Jan. 2012), http://www.
towerswatson.com/en/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/2012/01/201 1-Update-on-
US-Tort-Cost-Trends (select "download PDF').
268. See, e.g., J. Robert Hunter & Joanne Doroshow, Towers Perrin: "Gmde F'for
Fantastically Inflated "Tort Cost"Report AMS. FOR INS. REFORM (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.
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As for the portion of American tort liability that occupies this
Article, the acclaimed economist Joseph Stiglitz examined in a
coauthored paper one subcategory of cuipacat costs attributable to
asbestos bankruptcies.6' The Impact of Asbestos Liabilities on
Workers il Ban/aupt Firms started with workers but moved to other
persons and entities cuipacato It observed that asbestos businesses in
bankruptcy laid off large numbers of their employees, who in turn had
trouble finding new jobs and had to accept lower wages."' It priced
this detriment of wage loss at "between $1.4 billion and $3.0 billion.""
Predictably enough, Stiglitz and his coauthors also found an
association between bankruptcy and a drop in the value of employees'
retirement portfolios, which were likely to contain asbestos-
contaminated company stock.273
Asbestos-related financial distress also tends to reduce
investment by the business in itself As RAND researchers noted a
couple of years after the Stiglitz report was published, although "some
of the funds removed from capital markets when retained earnings are
used to compensate asbestos claimants return to those markets," 274 the
bottom-line effect of asbestos litigation on "investments and job
creation" is adverse. Though not amenable to precise quantification,
this detriment has an impact on the national economy.275
The Stiglitz report goes on to identify others cui pacat from
asbestos bankruptcies. Governments, for example, lose revenue they
would have collected in payroll taxes and corporate income tax;
reductions in these revenues are felt in both state and federal coffers.7
Governments, again both state and federal, also have to pay out more
in means-tested social insurance when individuals become
impoverished by unemployment.
insurance-reform.org/studies/TowersPerrin20l 0F2.pdf (responding to the 2009 edition of this
study).
269. Stiglitz, Orszag & Orszag, supr note 169, at 3.
270. Id. at 12-13.
271. Id at 28-29.
272. Id at 29.
273. Id at 30-39; see also Parloff, supr note 162 (noting that employees had held 16%
and 14% of their stock in Federal-Mogul Corporation and Owens Coming, respectively, when
the companies filed their bankruptcy petitions; these stocks had lost 99% and 97%,
respectively, of their value in the two years before filing).
274. Carroll et al., supm note 6, at 123.
275. Id.; see also id at 123 n.33 (expressing concern that the RAND estimates about
the effects of asbestos liability published in 2002 were cited too tendentiously, with
insufficient recognition that workers displaced by this liability get hired by other firms).
276. See Stiglitz, Orszag & Orszag, supra note 169, at 40-41.




Following the money of asbestos law in the United States reveals
a gendered pattern of distribution. At four distinct levels, women paid
for the asbestos law we now have. First, they fared worse than men in
court when they sought redress for the asbestosis or mesothelioma that
they attributed to asbestos exposure.' Second, they have not enjoyed
the reprieves from doctrinal harshness that male asbestos plaintiffs
have enjoyed.27' Third, they do not hold an equal share of the
occupational benefits that asbestos law created.280 The fourth level of
payment for women is one that men share. Asbestos law continues to
burden the national economy, to the detriment of all genders."'
Talented policy makers have been addressing American asbestos
law for four decades."' Their reform energies remain vitally necessary.






See supra Part II.
See supr Part M.
See supra PartlV
See supra Part V
See supa notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
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